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Abstract 
Forensic mental health professionals have conducted criminal responsibility (CR) 
evaluations for decades; however, relatively little is known about the specific 
methodologies employed when conducting such evaluations. The current study surveyed 
135 forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, examining components of CR evaluations, 
the use of psychological tests, time delay between offense date and evaluation date, and 
relationship between evaluator experience and opinions about CR evaluations. Results 
suggest very few differences between professional disciplines relating to reliance upon 
collateral records, number of collateral interviews conducted, and use of psychological 
assessment measures. Psychiatrists reported typically including a recognized psychiatric 
diagnosis in reports significantly more than psychologists. Respondents from both 
disciplines reported lengthy time delays between offense date and evaluation date, with 
time delays from respondents’ most recent evaluations averaging almost 10 months. 
Experience conducting CR evaluations was positively correlated with higher levels of 
confidence in ability to conduct accurate CR evaluations and greater knowledge of legal 
standards. The vast majority of respondents reporting that they felt they could detect 
when an examinee was malingering. Implications and future directions are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Criminal Responsibility 
Criminal responsibility (CR) evaluations are forensic mental health assessments 
investigating the mental state, capacities, and functioning of a defendant at the time of an 
alleged offense. Because of their retrospective nature, CR evaluations present a unique 
challenge for evaluators. To add to this challenge, Goldstein, Morse, and Shapiro (2003) 
suggest that CR evaluations are often conducted weeks, months, and even years after the 
offense occurred—which likely creates cognitive and memory barriers. Insanity 
evaluations are the most common type of CR evaluation, and other CR evaluations 
include diminished capacity, mens rea, and extreme emotional disturbance (Packer, 
2009). 
The term “criminal responsibility” is associated with a person’s blameworthiness 
for his or her actions. In criminal law, crimes are defined in terms of necessary elements 
that must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Many crimes require 
that a defendant possess a specific mental state or mens rea (Latin for “guilty mind”) at 
the time of the offense. Examples of mental states included in the Model Penal Code are 
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence (American Law Institute, 1962). To be 
found guilty of a crime that requires a specific mental state, the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed that requisite mental state at the 
time of the commission of the crime.   
Even if the prosecution meets its burden for all of the elements of a crime, a 
defendant may still be found not guilty if he or she can establish an affirmative defense, 
which limits or excuses a defendant’s criminal culpability. Affirmative defenses can be 
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partial or complete defenses. The insanity defense is one example of an affirmative 
defense. A defendant who successfully asserts an insanity defense will typically not 
receive an acquittal, but instead will receive a special verdict—“not guilty by reason of 
insanity” or NGRI. Defendants who are found NGRI are committed to a mental health 
facility for psychiatric treatment.  
1.2 Legal Standards for the Insanity Defense 
Because insanity evaluations are the most common CR evaluations that forensic 
mental health professionals conduct, it is important to understand how the doctrine has 
developed across jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, the definitions of legal insanity vary 
widely from state to state. Generally, there are five notable insanity defense standards: 
the M’Naghten standard, the irresistible-impulse test, the “Durham” rule, the ALI 
standard, and the Appreciation test. States vary widely in their adoption of these 
standards, with many creating their own state-specific variants to the standards. Four 
states have abolished the insanity defense all together, but still allow expert testimony on 
the mens rea of a defendant.1 A thorough discussion of the differing insanity standards is 
not within the scope of this thesis; however, each standard will be briefly discussed 
briefly below. See Packer (2009) for a more complete discussion of insanity standards 
across jurisdictions.  
1.2.1. M’Naghten Standard  
The first notable legal test for insanity stems from an 1843 English case involving 
Daniel M’Naghten. M’Naghten was a Scottish woodcutter who shot and killed a man 
whom he mistakenly believed to be the British Prime Minister. At the time of the 
                                                        
1 Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220), Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-207), Montana (Mont. Code. Ann. § 46-14-
102), and Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305) have all abolished the insanity defense. 
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shooting, M’Naghten was suffering from a paranoid delusion that the Prime Minister was 
conspiring against him (M’Naghten's Case, 1843). At trial, a jury acquitted M'Naghten, 
finding him not guilty by reason of insanity. Queen Victoria and the public were outraged 
over his acquittal and called for a stricter test for insanity (Weinreb, 1986). As a result, a 
panel of judges in the House of Lords reversed the verdict and, in their review of the 
case, developed a new standard for legal insanity —the M’Naghten standard. The 
M’Naghten standard created a presumption of sanity and stated that a person is not 
criminally responsible for an act when a mental disease or defect prevented them from 
knowing either (1) the nature and quality of the act or (2) whether the act was right or 
wrong (M’Naghten's Case, 1843).2 The M’Naghten standard is sometimes referred to as 
the “Right-Wrong Test.” It was implemented in the United States by 1851 and embraced 
with very little modification in American courts for nearly a century (Garrison, 1998).  
Today, the M’Naghten standard has been modified in many jurisdictions; 
however, some variant of the standard is still in effect in the federal courts and nearly half 
of all states.3 Despite its popularity, the M’Naghten standard has received criticism for 
                                                        
2 Specifically, the M’Naghten case states:  
In all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane…until the contrary be proved…and that to 
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the 
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
M’Naghten’s Case, 1843, p. 722. 
3 States that utilize the M’Naghten standard (or a variant thereof), include: Alabama (Ala. Code § 13A-1-1), 
Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 12.47.010), Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502), California (Ca. Penal Code § 
25), Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-101.5), Florida (Davis v. State, 32 So. 822 (1902)), Georgia (Ga. 
Code Ann. §  16-3-2), Iowa (Iowa Code § 701.4), Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020(1)), Minnesota 
(Minn. Stat. § 611.026), Mississippi (Laney v. State, 41 So. 2d 216 (1982)), Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
552.030), Nebraska (State v. Hurst, 529 N.W. 2d 303 (1999), Nevada (Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 
(2001)), New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-1), New Mexico (State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (1954)), North 
Carolina (State v. Bonney, 405 S.E. 2d 145 (1991)), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. §2901.01(A)(14), 
Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann 21 § 152), Pennsylvania (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §315(b)), South Carolina 
(S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-10), South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 22-1-2(20), Tennessee (Tenn. Code 
Ann. §39-11-501), Texas (Tex. Penal Code Ann § 8.01), Virginia (Bennett v. Commonwealth 511 S.E. 2d, 
439 (1999)), Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.12.010); and Federal (18 U.S.C.A. § 17). 
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focusing too much on the cognitive aspects of insanity (i.e., “knowing ” right from 
wrong) and not enough on the impact of emotions on mental state and volitional control 
(Packer, 2009). It has also been criticized for putting the psychiatric expert into a moral 
evaluator position, rather than clinical and scientific role (Slovenko, 1995).   
1.2.2 Irresistible-Impulse Test  
In an attempt to address the M’Naghten standard’s failure to consider volitional 
control, a few jurisdictions have incorporated an “irresistible-impulse” element into their 
insanity defense statutes.4 According to this modification, an individual will not be 
criminally responsible for an act if his mental disease or defect prevented him from 
controlling his criminal behavior (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 2007). This test 
absolves defendants of criminal responsibility when they are able to distinguish right and 
wrong, but are nonetheless unable to stop themselves from committing a criminal act 
because of a mental defect. It is also known as the “volitional test” and “control test.” The 
irresistible-impulse test has also been called the “policeman at the elbow” test, referring 
to whether the defendant would have committed the crime even if a police officer were 
standing at his or her elbow (Packer, 2009). In practice, the irresistible-impulse test is 
largely considered problematic because forensic mental health professionals have no way 
to accurately assess whether an impulse could have been resisted (Packer, 2009). 
1.2.3 Durham Test  
The M’Naghten standard and variants thereof faced growing dissatisfaction 
during the 1950s. Another standard, known as the “Durham” test or “Product Standard,” 
was put forth by Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
                                                        
4 Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. §  § 16-3-2; 16-3-3), New Mexico (State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (1954)), and 
Virginia  (Bennett v. Commonwealth 511 S.E. 2d, 439 (1999)) have adopted modified versions of the 
irresistible-impulse test.  
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Columbia Circuit. In   Durham v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1954), the appellate court 
replaced the M’Naghten standard and irresistible-impulse test with a broader and more 
medically-based insanity standard. According to the Durham test, the defendant should 
not be criminally responsible for behavior that was the “product of mental disease or 
defect” (Durham v. United States, pp. 874–875). Initially, this standard was considered a 
revolutionary departure from the antiquated moral considerations the right-wrong test and 
welcome change into a more neutral scientific determination of insanity. It was hailed as 
reflecting advances in psychiatric and psychological research, and implemented in the 
District of Columbia and New Hampshire.5 However, the Durham test proved vague and 
difficult to apply. It was heavily criticized and was abandoned by federal courts in 1972 
(U.S. v. Brawner, U.S. App. D.C., 1972). Much of the criticism surrounding the Durham 
test was related to the broad nature of the standard and vague definitions of mental 
disease or defect (Packer, 2009). For example, there was confusion as to whether “mental 
disease or defect” was intended to refer to any disorders defined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or just psychosis. Furthermore, it was 
unclear whether substance use and personality disorders should satisfy the “mental 
disease or defect” requirement. In theory, the broad language of the standard was 
intended to give forensic mental health professionals more flexibility in providing the 
court with relevant mental health testimony and information. However, in practice, the 
broad definitions proved unworkable for legal standards, and it was criticized for 
unintentionally granting mental health experts too much influence in the courtroom 
(Packer, 2009).  
                                                        
5 See State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 369(N.H. 1871) (stating, “if the defendant killed his wife in a manner that 
would be criminal and unlawful if the defendant were sane, the verdict should be “not guilty by reason of 
insanity,” if the killing was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant).  
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1.2.4 ALI Standard  
The American Law Institute (ALI) introduced a model insanity defense statute in 
1962, which was intended to soften M’Naghten and include more medically-based 
elements. The ALI standard, also known the “Substantial-Capacity Test,” combines 
elements of both the M’Naghten standard and the irresistible-impulse test by including 
both a cognitive and volitional prong (Packer, 2009). It states that that an individual is not 
criminally responsible for an act if “as a result of mental illness or mental defect he 
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law” (Model Penal Code, Sec. 401(1), 
1962). The ALI formulation significantly softened the M’Naghten standard by requiring 
that a defendant merely lack a “substantial capacity” to understand right from wrong, 
rather than requiring the defendant to have no understanding whatsoever of the 
wrongfulness of his or her acts. Today, 15 states still rely on some version of the ALI 
standard;6 however, many standards have been modified in the wake of the John 
Hinckley, Jr. case (discussed below). 
1.2.5 Appreciation Test  
On March 30, 1981, John Hinckley Jr. set out to impress the actress Jodie Foster 
by attempting to assassinate then-president Ronald Reagan outside a Washington, D.C. 
hotel. Hinckley fired six gunshots into a crowd of onlookers, hitting the president, a 
                                                        
6 States that have adopted the ALI standard or a variant thereof, include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
312), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 18 704-400), Illinois 
(720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-2(a)), Indiana (IND. CODE § 35-41-3-6(a)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
504.020(1)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-1. §39), Maryland (MD. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
ANN. §3-109), Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E. 2d, 556 (1967)), Michigan (MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 768.21a(1)), New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW §40.15), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295), 
Rhode Island (State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (1979)), Vermont (VT. ST. ANN. 13 § 4801), West Virginia 
(State v. Grimm, 195 S.E. 2d 637 (1973)), Wisconsin (WISC. STAT. ANN. § 971.15), Wyoming (WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-11-305(b), and Federal (18 U.S.C.A. §17). 
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police officer, a secret service agent, and press secretary James Brady (Raines, 1981). At 
trial, Hinckley was acquitted of murder, 13 assault charges, and several weapons charges. 
He was found not guilty by reason of insanity, which sparked public outrage and 
backlash over the insanity laws throughout the United States (Hans, 1986).  In response 
to the Hinckley verdict, Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 
which narrowed the federal insanity defense definition and adopted a new test similar to 
the old M’Naghten standard (Packer, 2009). Specifically, the volitional prong of the test 
(i.e., lacked the capacity to control his behavior) was eliminated. Sometimes known as 
the “Appreciation Test,” the new federal insanity standard requires an offender to 
demonstrate a “severe” mental disease or defect that caused the offender to be “unable” 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the criminal act (18 U.S.C. § 402 (1984)). In addition to 
the elimination of the volitional prong, Congress adopted several procedural provisions 
that made successful insanity defenses more difficult. For example, the Act placed the 
burden of proof on the defendant to establish the insanity defense by clear and convincing 
evidence, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the diminished capacity 
defense, and created a "not guilty only by reason of insanity" verdict (18 U.S.C. § 402 
(1984)). 
1.2.6 “Guilty But Mentally Ill”  
Although not a legal standard for the insanity defense as discussed above, it is 
important to mention that 12 states have authorized a verdict option of “guilty but 
mentally ill” (GBMI) (Melton, 2007).7 In states that allow GBMI, jurors in insanity cases 
are given three options for their ultimate verdict: not guilty, NGRI, or “guilty but 
                                                        
7 Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah (LaFond, 1990). 
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mentally ill” (GBMI). Defendants found GBMI are still considered legal guilty of their 
crimes and still receive the exact same punishment length as someone who is convicted 
outright that crime. However, in consideration of their mental illness, GBMI offenders 
are entitled to mental health treatment during their confinement, at least while mental 
illness symptoms are present (Melton, 2007). The exact procedures and standards for 
GBMI vary by jurisdiction. GBMI has criticized as being conceptually flawed, 
misleading to juries, and ineffective in reducing insanity acquittals (see Melton (2007) for 
a thorough discussion of these GBMI concerns).  
1.3 Research Regarding CR Evaluations 
Mental health experts have conducted CR evaluations for decades; however, 
empirical research into CR evaluations has been “relatively limited” (Packer, 2009, p. 
59). Little is known about the specific methodologies employed by forensic mental health 
professionals when conducting CR evaluations. Instead, research tends to focus on the 
characteristics of cases in which the insanity defense is raised, rather than on the nature of 
the CR evaluation itself (Packer, 2009). For example, a few studies have looked at inter-
rater reliability between evaluators in sanity outcomes (see Phillips et al., 1988; Rogers et 
al., 1981, 1984). Other studies have examined the correlation between clinical opinion 
and court decision in insanity cases (see Fukunga, Pasewark, Hawkins, & Gudeman, 
1981). Only a handful of studies have examined CR evaluation quality and methodology. 
These studies will be discussed below.  
1.3.1 Quality of CR Reports Across Disciplines 
In an early study, Petrella and Poythress (1983) compared the quality of 
competence to stand trial reports (CST) and CR reports between psychiatrists and 
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psychologists. Actual CST and CR reports were sent to judges and lawyers to review and 
rate. Findings from the study suggest that there were very few differences in CR report 
quality between forensic psychologists and psychiatrists (Petrella & Poythress, 1983). 
Psychologists tended to write lengthier reports than psychiatrist for both CST and CR 
evaluations; however, differences in quantity does not necessarily equate to differences in 
report quality. Given that Petrella and Poythress (1983) found few differences in report 
quality, this study has often been used to support the proposition that forensic 
psychologists can perform CR evaluations at the same level as forensic psychiatrists 
(Packer, 2009). Despite this finding, a handful of states do not allow psychologists to 
conduct criminal responsibility evaluations.8  
1.3.2 Information Included in CR Reports 
Additionally, previous research has examined the types of information included in 
CR evaluations. In a 1995 study, Heilbrun and Collins investigated forensic report 
characteristics of 277 CST and CR evaluations in Florida. Results from this study suggest 
that use of third-party information (such as arrest reports and prior mental health 
evaluations) in CST and CR evaluations was significantly different between hospital and 
community-based settings. Third-party information was cited more frequently in hospital-
based settings than community-based reports (Heilbrun & Collins, 1995). Although a 
significant difference between settings was observed, Heilbrun and Collins (1995) 
cautioned that this difference may not capture the community-based clinicians’ attempts 
to obtain third-party information. This study also found that psychological testing was 
used infrequently, especially in hospital-based evaluations. Only 16% of the reports in the 
                                                        
8 Pennsylvania has recently changed its statute to allow licensed psychologists to conduct criminal 
responsibility evaluations. The law became effective May 19, 2014 (after data collection for this project 
was complete; see 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7404 (West)). 
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sample included testing. The most frequently cited psychological tests were the MMPI 
and WAIS-R (Heilbrun & Collins, 1995). The authors note that lack of psychological 
testing may not have any clear implications for the quality forensic reports, as 
psychological testing should only be used when it is relevant and reliable (Heilbrun & 
Collins, 1995).   
Also investigating the use of psychological assessments in CR evaluations, 
Borum and Grisso (1995) surveyed 53 forensic psychologists and 43 forensic 
psychiatrists concerning their use of psychological testing in CST and CR evaluations. In 
addition to utilization of psychological assessments, survey respondents were asked about 
their opinions regarding the importance of psychological testing for these evaluations. 
Borum and Grisso (1995) reported a statistically significant difference in the frequency of 
psychological assessment usage between psychiatrists and psychologists in CR 
evaluations, with 68% of forensic psychologists and 42% of forensic psychiatrists 
reporting that they used psychological testing “frequently” or “always.” Interestingly, 
although a significant difference in actual assessment usage was observed, Borum and 
Grisso (1995) found that there was no significant difference in perceived importance of 
psychological testing between psychologists and psychiatrists.   
In a more recent study, Warren, Murrie, Chauhan, Dietz, and Morris (2004) 
analyzed 5,175 sanity evaluations conducted by psychiatrists and psychologists over a 
10-year period in Virginia. This study was primarily interested in factors that contribute 
to a sane or insane recommendation; however, it also provided a glimpse into the types of 
information relied upon when forming CR psycholegal opinions. Results from this study 
suggest that there is a wide range of CR evaluation methodology being used (Warren et 
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al., 2004). Forensic psychologists used psychological and neuropsychological tests 
significantly more than psychiatrists (Warren et al., 2004). Perhaps more importantly, 
although there were significant differences in methodologies employed between 
professional disciplines, no significant differences were observed in the quality of reports 
or proportion of defendants opined to meet the insanity standard (Warren et al., 2004).  
1.3.3 Information Missing in CR Reports 
Warren and colleagues (2004) found that evaluators, regardless of professional 
discipline, often offered their opinions on the basis of incomplete data when conducting 
CR evaluations.  Notably, in more than half of cases examined, evaluators offered CR 
opinions without having examined statements by the defendant, the defendant’s criminal 
history, and/or witness statements (Warren et al., 2004). Even more concerning, in a 
small proportion of cases, evaluators offered opinions about mental state at the time of 
offense without obtaining any collateral information about the alleged offense. 
Commenting on the findings, Warren and colleagues (2004) cautioned of the danger of 
reaching the wrong conclusion when failing to consider clinically and legally relevant 
sources of information. Evaluators who do not consider collateral information about the 
alleged offense in a CR evaluation may have a difficult time defending their omission if 
called to testify. Furthermore, failure to consider collateral information about the alleged 
offense may even be considered negligent, considering that most forensic professionals 
view collateral information about the alleged offense as necessary when conducting CR 
evaluations (Borum & Grisso, 1996).    
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1.3.4 Impact of Evaluator Experience 
The experience level of forensic evaluators also appears to have a significant 
impact on opinions about sanity. Specifically, Warren and colleagues (2004) found that 
less experienced evaluators, were more likely to opine that the defendant met the insanity 
standardthan evaluators with more experience. This finding appears to be true regardless 
of professional discipline. 
1.4 Recommended Assessment Procedures for Evaluation of CR 
CR evaluations can be some of the most complex and difficult evaluations that 
forensic mental health professionals conduct. This is largely because the legal criteria are 
amorphous, evaluations are context specific, and evaluations require a retrospective 
reconstruction of mental state. As stated by Melton et al. (2007), forensic mental health 
professionals are often forced to play a much larger investigative role in CR evaluations 
than they do in many other evaluation contexts. To aid in these complex evaluations, 
Goldstein et al. (2003) and Packer (2009) provide several recommendations.   
General recommendations for conducting CR evaluations include: use a 
hypothesis-testing method and rely on multiple sources of data to help test these 
hypotheses; memorialize the exact responses and statements by defendants; explore  
discrepancies between the defendant’s present behavior and the behavior claimed to have 
occurred at the time of the offense; and conduct evaluations as soon as possible after the 
offense (Goldstein et al., 2003). Packer (2009) also suggests that, at certain times, it may 
be necessary to point-out, and perhaps confront, the defendant about discrepancies in his 
or her account. Discrepancies may arise both internally (within the defendant’s own 
narrative) and externally (as compared to other external documentation). Importantly, 
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both Goldstein et al. (2003) and Packer (2009) emphasize that the role of the forensic 
examiner conducting CR evaluations is objective—not an advocate for the defendant’s 
position. As such, the evaluator must remain neutral and assume the role of fact-finder, 
using multiple sources of data and hypothesis testing (Goldstein et al., 2003; Packer, 
2009).  
The following domains of information may be relevant to CR evaluations: family 
and developmental history, educational history, social history, employment history, 
religious history (in certain cases), substance use history, criminal history, offense-
history, and current mental state (Packer, 2009). In addition to this list, Goldstein and 
colleagues (2003) recommend that evaluators collect detailed demographic information, 
including, birthday, age, birth order, birth place, marital status, occupation, race, and 
present living arrangement. The defendant’s adjustment and behavior in jail should be 
considered as a relevant piece of information concerning the defendant’s mental state 
around the time of the crime (Goldstein et al., 2003).   
1.4.1 Family and Developmental History 
Family and developmental history should include information about the 
defendant’s family of origin, childhood events, and relationships with family members as 
a child, and special attention should be given to any family history of mental illness or 
substance abuse. Also, childhood trauma, serious illnesses/injuries, abuse, and neglect 
should be investigated (Packer, 2009). Goldstein et al. (2003) suggest that social and 
medical history be obtained from the directly from the defendant first and then 
augmented with collateral sources. Inconsistencies should be noted.   
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1.4.2 Educational History 
Ideally, educational information should be obtained from the defendant, family 
members, and third party documentation. Packer (2009) suggests that when educational 
issues seem pertinent to the evaluation, official school documentation (i.e., report cards, 
IEP’s) should be requested. Educational information should include academic 
performance (grades and highest grade completed), behavior and social adjustment, and 
whether the defendant received special education services and/or had a learning disability 
(Packer, 2009). 
1.4.3 Occupational History 
Investigation into the defendant’s employment history provides important 
information related to the defendant’s ability to obtain and maintain employment. Those 
CR responsibility evaluations should inquire about the number of different jobs held, 
length of employment at each job, and reason for termination (Packer, 2009). Military 
history should also be explored with special emphasis on potential exposure and reaction 
to trauma (Packer, 2009). 
1.4.4 Mental Health History 
Mental health history is an essential area that must be investigated in CR 
evaluations. At the outset, forensic mental health professionals conducting CR 
evaluations should determine whether the defendant has ever been diagnosed with a 
mental or development disorder (Packer, 2009). Other areas to investigate in this domain 
include whether the defendant has ever received mental health treatment, the efficacy of 
that treatment, treatment history, symptomatic presentation, and medication history 
(Packer, 2009). Both Packer (2009) and Goldstein et al. (2003) recommend that mental 
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health history information be obtained from the defendant, knowledgeable collateral 
sources (usually family members), and official documents (medical records). Information 
from collateral sources and third-party documentation may be especially important in this 
domain, as the defendant may not have accurate insight into his or her mental illness.  
 1.4.5 Medical History 
Medical history is particularly important when it may have an impact on the 
defendant’s mental status (Packer, 2009). Information about significant medical illnesses, 
history of serious head injuries, and history of strokes or seizures should be documented. 
Those conducting CR evaluations should pay special attention to any reported changes in 
mood, cognition, or behavior after the illness/injury (Packer, 2009). 
 1.4.6 Religious History 
Religious history may not always be an important domain to assess in CR 
evaluations. However, this domain might be important if the defendant presents with 
delusions that are religious in nature (Packer, 2009). If so, information about religious 
affiliation, religious beliefs and practices, and commitment to the religion should be 
obtain.  Interestingly, Packer (2009) characterizes delusions of a political nature as 
analogous to religious delusions and suggests that they should be investigated the same 
way. 
 1.4.7 Substance Use History 
Substance use history is a particularly important domain to assess, especially 
because it has important implications for the insanity defense. Packer (2009) recommends 
that all CR evaluations include a careful history of substance use. Those conducting CR 
evaluations should pay particular attention to patterns of use at and around the time of the 
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defendant’s alleged offense, and the relationship between the defendant’s substance use 
presentation and symptoms of mental illness (Packer, 2009). Specifically, evaluators 
should inquire about age of first drug/alcohol use, the frequency and amount of usage, 
inpatient and/or outpatient substance abuse treatment, functional impairments associated 
with drug use (i.e., school, work, criminal, and/or relationship problems), blackouts 
associated with drug or alcohol use, and any known withdrawal effects (Packer, 2009). 
1.4.8 Criminal History 
 Evaluation of a defendant’s criminal history should be part of every CR 
evaluation. This should include information about both criminal convictions and arrests; 
however, including information about arrest history in the final report is not always 
necessary. Ideally, information about an individual’s criminal history should come from 
official documentation (i.e., a defendant’s “rap sheet”), rather than solely relying upon 
the defendant’s report. Additionally, it is important to be cognizant of the jurisdiction(s) 
included on the “rap sheet.” Importantly, those conducting CR evaluations should be 
aware that many crimes are undetected. As such, evaluators should ask both the 
defendant and knowledgeable collateral sources about possible criminal behavior that did 
not result in an arrest or conviction (Packer, 2009). Finally, evaluators should also 
consider whether the defendant has ever been a victim of intentional violence (such as a 
shooting or stabbing) (Packer, 2009). 
 1.4.9 Mental Status Exam 
A thorough and comprehensive examination of the defendant’s mental 
functioning at the time of the evaluation is an important part to every CR evaluation. 
However, mental state at the time of evaluation may not reflect the defendant’s mental 
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state at the time of offense (Packer, 2009). Nevertheless, observations on current mental 
functioning and symptoms may provide useful information as to the defendant’s baseline 
functioning and may generate information relevant to the reconstruction of the 
defendant’s criminal responsibility. Recommended areas to assess, include 
behavior/demeanor/attitude toward the evaluation, orientation (awareness of person, 
place, and time), attention and concentration abilities, memory, mood and affect, thought 
content (i.e., delusions or unusual beliefs), thought processes (i.e., loose associations, 
tangential communication), perception (i.e., hallucinations), insight, intellectual 
functioning, and current medications (Packer, 2009). 
1.4.10 Current Offense 
Information about the current offense is, in most cases, the most important 
domain to investigate in a CR evaluation. Sources of data should include police and third-
party reports, and the defendant’s own account of the alleged offense (Packer, 2009). 
Family members and friends may also have useful information pertaining to the 
defendant’s mental state around the time of the alleged offense. Regarding the 
defendant’s own account, Goldstein and colleagues (2003) suggest that researchers 
attempt to accurately collect the defendant’s own version of the offense first. Evaluators 
are advised to save sensitive questions about the crime until later in the interview—after 
good rapport and trust are established (Goldstein et al., 2003). It is suggested that 
evaluators ask open-ended questions and allow the defendant to give an uninterrupted 
account of the crime and the events leading up to it. Only after the uninterrupted version 
is given should evaluators ask clarifying questions and attempt to resolve any vagueness 
(Goldstein et al., 2003). Importantly, evaluators should pay special attention to the 
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reasons “why” the defendant committed the offense, as this is a crucial issue in mental 
defense cases. Goldstein et al. (2003) suggest that evaluators focus on the defendant’s 
reported thoughts, feelings, and perceptions at the time of offense. Evaluators should also 
attempt to determine if the defendant made any attempt to refrain from committing the 
act. Information regarding the defendant’s mental state in the week leading up to the 
crime may also be helpful when trying to determine a retrospective mental state (Rogers, 
1984).    
The exact questions that evaluators ask will vary according to the insanity 
standard in their jurisdiction. Packer (2009) advises CR evaluators to pursue focal 
questions related to the specific insanity standards of their jurisdictions. To assess the 
cognitive prong, the evaluator should inquire as to whether the defendant thought at the 
time of the offense that his or her behavior was wrong or illegal. Follow-up questions 
should focus on reasoning behind the answers given. Importantly, the evaluation should 
not stop if the defendant outright states that he/she knew what he was doing was wrong. 
Packer (2009) warns that just because the defendant makes such a statement does not 
mean that it was necessarily true at the time of the offense. The defendant may be 
confused about past events, have distorted recollections, or may be motivated to say that 
he or she knew their behavior was wrong for some other reason.  
Instead of terminating the evaluation when a defendant says that he/she knew 
what he was doing was wrong, CR evaluators should consult with collateral sources and 
third-party documents looking for data that might be consistent or inconsistent with the 
defendant’s account of whether he or she knew the behavior was wrong. In jurisdictions 
with a volitional prong to their insanity defense, CR evaluators should inquire about the 
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defendants’ decisions, planfulness, and course of action (Packer, 2009). Defendants 
should be ask whether they considered other alternatives and how long beforehand they 
had been planning the criminal behavior (Packer, 2009). CR evaluators should also assess 
steps for preparations and methods for avoiding police detection (Packer, 2009). 
Although the defendant’s personal account of the crime is an important source of 
data, it must be integrated with other information (i.e., police reports, third-party 
interviews) to formulate the best fit for what actually happened. Packer (2009) cautions 
that “defendants may have distorted views of their past behaviors, thoughts or emotions 
that can impair accuracy” (p. 107). Additionally, the defendant is being asked questions 
about his or her state of mind that may have been weeks, months, or even years earlier 
(Packer, 2009). Distortions in the defendant’s version of events may reflect purposeful 
distortions (intended to influence or make a particular impression on the evaluator) and/or 
unintentional distortions that are simply the result of difficulty recalling events from a 
certain time in the past (Packer, 2009). Mental illness and substance use may further 
exacerbate these distortions.    
1.4.11 Psychological Testing 
In regards to psychological testing, Goldstein et al. (2003) suggest that traditional 
psychological tests (e.g., MMPI-2, WAIS-IV) and specialized forensic measures (e.g., R-
CRAS, SIRS, PCL-R) may be valuable in CR evaluations. However, evaluators should be 
cautioned that testing results reflect the defendant’s current functioning, and may not 
accurately represent functioning at the time of the alleged offense. Additionally, the 
choice of whether to use a test and what test to use depends on the context of the case and 
should always be consistent with APA standards (Goldstein et al., 2003). When choosing 
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whether to administer an assessment, the evaluator should select a test based on its (1) 
relevance to the issue being investigated, (2) reliability and validity, and (3) 
appropriateness for the population applicable to the particular defendant (Packer, 2009).  
1.5 Ethical Issues in Evaluation of CR  
There are several sources for best practice and ethical delivery of services in 
FMHA (see e.g., American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 1991; Giorgi-Guarnieri 
et al., 2002; Heilbrun, 2001; Melton et al., 1997, 2007; Heilbrun, DeMatteo, Marczyk, & 
Goldstein, 2008; Heilbrun, Grisso, & Goldstein, 2008; Specialty Guidelines for Forensic 
Psychology, 2013). A comprehensive discussion of all best practice guidelines for FMHA 
is beyond scope of this project; suffice it to say that recommendations typically include 
relying upon multiple sources of information, understanding the difference between 
clinical and forensic roles, not answering the ultimate legal issue, preparing user-friendly 
reports, and using carefully selected and well-validated psychological assessments 
(Heilbrun et al., 2008). In addition to general best practice recommendations for FMHA, 
two ethical considerations are especially important in CR evaluations: (1) informed 
consent, and (2) knowledge of relevant legal standards and professional statutory 
regulations.  
1.5.1 Informed Consent  
Forensic mental health professionals conducting CR evaluations must be 
particularly diligent obtaining informed consent (Goldstein et al., 2003). CR evaluations 
involve heightened informed consent considerations because the defendant will be asked 
to discuss, in detail, the circumstances surrounding the commission of his or her crime. 
These crime-specific details may be incriminating and could potentially harm the 
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defendant’s legal interests. As a result, the limits of confidentiality and nature of the 
evaluation process should be clearly discussed. It is recommended that examinees be 
informed of (1) the purpose of the evaluation, (2) the name of the party requesting the 
evaluation, (3) the name(s) of other parties who will have access to the report, (4) the 
limits of confidentiality and lack of privileged communication, (5) the non-therapeutic 
nature of the evaluation, (6) the type of material that will be collected (e.g., collateral 
interviews, psychological tests, clinical interview), (7) the evaluation process and 
possibility for testimony, (8) information which could trigger mandatory reporting (e.g., 
child abuse), and (9) whether the defendant may decline to participate and possible 
consequences for declining to participate in the evaluation (Kalmback & Lyons, 2006). 
Confidentiality is always a key area to discuss with an examinee when obtaining 
informed consent. The degree of confidentiality in a CR evaluation varies based on the 
jurisdiction and party who retained the expert (defense, prosecution, or court-ordered). In 
some states, potentially incriminating information that is given to an expert retained by 
the defense is protected by attorney-client privilege. As such, it does not need to be 
shared with the prosecution (e.g., State v. Pratt, 1979; United States v. Alvarez, 1975). 
However, in other jurisdictions, once a psychiatric issue is raised by the defense, 
attorney-client privilege is essentially waived and the results from the defense expert 
must be available to the prosecution (see, e.g., Noggle v. Marshall, 1983). In cases where 
the expert is hired by the prosecution, any information that would be of “material 
assistance” to the defense must be turned over (Goldstein et al., 2003). Results from 
court-ordered evaluations have very limited confidentiality and must be made available to 
all parties—the judge, defense, and prosecution (Goldstein et al., 2003). There is debate 
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within the field as to whether informed consent must be obtained in written form or 
whether verbal notification is sufficient (see Melton et al., 2007; Shapiro, 1999). Either 
way, the consent and disclosure process should be carefully documented and noted within 
the final report (Kalmbach & Lyons, 2006). 
1.5.2 Familiarity with Relevant Legal Standards and Professional Ethics 
Codes  
The next important ethical consideration for conducting CR evaluations pertains 
to knowledge of relevant legal standards and professional ethics codes. Because insanity 
standards vary considerably across jurisdictions, it is imperative that forensic mental 
health professionals are familiar with the insanity standard used in their jurisdiction and 
conduct their evaluation accordingly. A thorough understanding of the specific standard 
is necessary for evaluators to assess the appropriate legal criteria and provide the court 
with useful and relevant psycho-legal information (Packer, 2009). Relatedly, forensic 
mental health professionals should have a working knowledge of Rules of Evidence and 
Rules of Discovery (Kalmbach & Lyons, 2006). The rules of evidence governing ultimate 
issue testimony vary by jurisdiction.  
In some jurisdictions, forensic mental health professionals are not permitted to 
offer testimony about the ultimate legal issue (i.e., whether a defendant is not guilty by 
reason of insanity). This is true in federal system, where Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence states, “In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about 
whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone” 
(Fed. R. Evid. 704(b)). Other jurisdictions—for example, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
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and Wisconsin—allow testimony on the ultimate legal issue in CR cases.9 Regardless of 
whether ultimate legal issue testimony is permitted by statute, best practice guidelines 
suggest that forensic mental health professionals generally refrain from offering an 
opinion on the ultimate legal issue and leave that role to the fact-finder (Heilbrun, Grisso, 
& Goldstein, 2009).   
Finally, forensic mental health professionals must be knowledgeable of 
professional ethics codes and standards of practice (Kalmbach & Lyons, 2006). The 
decision to participate in a legal forum opens the door into inquiries the forensic 
evaluation techniques and procedures. The credibility of forensic mental health 
professionals can be weakened if they are unfamiliar with or do not adhere to 
professional ethics codes and forensic specialty guidelines.  
 
2. Purpose and Rationale 
2.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how CR evaluations are conducted in 
everyday practice throughout the United States. Specifically, this study explored (1) the 
use of third-party information in CR evaluations; (2) the time delay between offense date 
and evaluation date; (3) the nature and number of collateral interviews conducted in 
person or via telephone; (4) the methods of evaluating/interviewing defendants about CR; 
(5) the inclusion of a recognized psychiatric diagnosis (DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR, and 
DSM-5) in the final report; (6) the use of traditional psychological tests and specialized 
forensic measures; and (7) CR evaluator opinions concerning their abilities to conduct 
                                                        
9 DEL. R. EVID. 704; PA. R. EVID. 704; TEX. R. EVID. 704; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 907.04. 
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valid and reliable CR evaluations. Additionally, professional discipline differences 
(psychology and psychiatry), and differences in experience level were explored.  
Until now, there have been relatively few empirical studies investigating the 
methodology and components of CR evaluations. Several of the studies that have been 
conducted are nearly 20 years old and, consequently, may not provide an accurate 
account of how CR evaluations are conducted today (see, e.g., Borum & Grisso, 1995; 
Heilbrun & Collins, 1995). Given the substantial growth of forensic psychology over the 
past three decades (see Heilbrun & Brooks, 2010), investigation of current practice in CR 
evaluation is particularly important. Evaluation methodology employed nearly two 
decades ago may have changed substantially from the methodology used today.  
2.2 Hypotheses  
This was an exploratory study intended to examine how CR evaluations are 
currently conducted. Hypotheses related to (1) components of CR evaluations, (2) time 
delay between alleged offense and evaluation date, and (3) experience level of evaluators 
conducting CR evaluations. It was hypothesized that significant differences would exist 
between professional discipline and experience level of survey respondents 
Regarding components of CR evaluations, it was hypothesized that there would 
be considerable variability in third-party information, collateral interviews, and the use of 
psychological assessment included in CR evaluations. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that: 
 Hypothesis 1---Medical and Psychiatric Records:   
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o Significantly more forensic psychiatrists than psychologists would report 
typically using medical records (Hypothesis 1A) and psychiatric records 
(Hypothesis 1B) for their criminal responsibility evaluations. 
o Significantly more forensic psychiatrists than psychologists would report 
using a previous medical record (Hypothesis 1C) and psychiatric record 
(Hypothesis 1D) for their most recent CR evaluation. 
 Hypothesis 2—Collateral Interviews (in person or via telephone): Forensic 
psychologists would report relying upon significantly more collateral 
interviews than forensic psychiatrists typically (Hypothesis 2A) and in their 
most recent evaluation (Hypothesis 2B). 
 Hypothesis 3—Psychiatric Diagnosis: Significantly more forensic 
psychiatrists would report including a recognized psychiatric diagnosis (DSM-
IV, DSM-IV-TR, and DSM-5) in their most recent criminal responsibility 
evaluation. 
 Hypothesis 4—Psychological Assessment: Forensic psychologists would 
report using traditional psychological assessments (Hypothesis 4A) and 
specialized forensic assessments (Hypothesis 4B) in their most recent 
evaluation significantly more than forensic psychiatrists. 
In regards to the length of time between the alleged offense and the CR evaluation, it was 
hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 5—Length of Delay:  Both forensic psychologists and 
psychiatrists will report a similarly long delay between the date of the alleged 
offense and the date of the evaluation. 
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Finally, hypotheses related to forensic mental health professional experience and 
perceptions about the nature of CR evaluations were: 
 Hypothesis 6—Competence:  Less experienced forensic mental health 
professionals would report feeling less competent conducting CR evaluations 
than those forensic mental health professionals with more than 10 years of 
experience. 
 Hypothesis 7—Guidance:  There would be a significant relationship between 
experience conducting CR evaluations and the reported need for guidance 
from the field about how to conduct CR evaluations, such that those with 
more experience conducting CR evaluations would report less need for 
guidance from the field.   
 Hypothesis 8—Familiarity with Legal Criteria:  There would be a significant 
relationship between experience conducting CR evaluations and reported 
knowledge of the appropriate legal standards. 
3. Method 
3.1 Survey Respondents 
Survey respondents were recruited in two phases. In Phase 1, invitations to 
participate in the survey were emailed to 1,358 potential respondents who were members 
of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL), American Psychology-Law 
Society (AP-LS), American Academy of Forensic Psychology (AAFP), and American 
Board of Forensic Psychology (ABFP). Initial recruitment yielded 124 respondents 
(11.9% response rate); 101 of which were psychologists. In an effort to increase the total 
sample size and recruit more psychiatrists, an IRB modification was submitted to recruit 
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board certified psychiatrists specializing in forensic psychiatry. Upon gaining IRB 
approval for study modification, an additional 408 potential participants were identified 
through the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. (ABPN) verifyCERT 
website and invited via email to participate in the survey. This supplementary recruitment 
of ABPN members yielded 38 survey respondents (10.7% response rate). In total, 162 
forensic mental health professionals responded to the survey [psychiatrists, n = 61; 
psychologists, n = 101].  
 In an effort to obtain a sample of forensic mental health professionals with 
significant experience conducting CR evaluations, 27 survey respondents were removed 
from further analysis based on predetermined eligibility requirements. Of the 162 total 
respondents to the survey, individuals were removed if they were not licensed in the 
United States (for psychologists) (n = 4) or board certified in psychiatry (for 
psychiatrists) (n = 1); had never conducted a CR evaluation as professional (n = 17); or 
reported having less than 10% of their caseload consisting of forensic clients (n = 14).10  
  Ultimately, 135 survey respondents met inclusion criteria and were included in 
this study. Of the final group of 135 participants, 87 identified as psychologists (64%) 
and 48 identified as psychiatrists (36%) (See Table 1, p. 33 and Table 2, p. 34). The 
majority of respondents were male (n = 81, 60%) and age ranged from 30 to 74 years 
(Mage = 51.00, SD = 11.89). The vast majority of survey respondents were White or 
Caucasian, either solely (n = 123, or 91%) or in conjunction with Hispanic, Latino, or 
Spanish origin (n = 4, or 3%). Survey respondents reported practicing in 40 states and the 
District of Columbia (See Table 3, p. 34).  
 
                                                        
10 Several survey respondents did not meet eligibility criteria for more than one item.  
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Table 1. Sample Demographic Information (N = 135) 
Demographics Frequency  Percentage* 
Gender   
Male  81 60.0% 
Female  53 39.3% 
Unreported   1 0.7% 
Race/Ethnicity**   
White or Caucasian 123 91.1% 
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (of any race)   4 3.0% 
African American   2 1.5% 
Asian   4 3.0% 
Other   3 2.2% 
How Would You Define Yourself Professionally?**   
Forensic Psychologist 77 57.0% 
Forensic Psychiatrist 46 34.1% 
Clinical Psychologist 16 11.9% 
Psychiatrist  4 3.0% 
* NOTE: Based on N = 135. ** Individuals could be classified into multiple groups. 
 
Table 2. Professional Training (N = 135) 
Demographics Frequency Percentage 
Degree (N = 135)   
M.D. 47 34.8% 
Ph.D. 62 45.9% 
Psy.D. 24 17.8% 
Unreported 2 1.5% 
Board Certification   
Psychologists (n = 87) 44 50.6% 
ABFP 33 37.9% 
ABCN 2 2.3% 
ABCP 1 1.1% 
Unreported 8 9.2% 
Psychiatrists (n = 48) 48 100.0% 
ABPN 48 100.0% 
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Table 3. Licensed States of Practice (N = 135)* 
 
State Psychiatry Psychology 
AL   2   2 
AK   1   0 
AZ   1   0 
AR   1   0 
CA   7   5 
CO   0   1 
CT   1   3 
DE   0   0 
DC   0   4 
FL   5   6 
GA   1   3 
HI   0   0 
ID   0   0 
IL   2   2 
IN   1   0 
IA   2   1 
KS 0   0 
KY 2   0 
LA 5   0 
ME 1   5 
MD 8   9 
MA 3 10 
MI 0   2 
MN 1   3 
MS 0   0 
MO 1   2 
MT 0   0 
NE 1   0 
NV 0   0 
NH 0   0 
NJ 2   3 
NM 1   1 
NY 8   6 
NC 1   1 
ND 0   0 
OH 4 10 
OK 0   3 
OR 1   0 
PA 0   3 
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RI 1   0 
SC 2   3 
SD 0   0 
TN 0   1 
TX 1 11 
UT 0   5 
VT 1   0 
VA 0   9 
WA 1   3 
WV 2   1 
WI 1    1 
WY  0   0 
*Respondents could be licensed in multiple states. 
3.2 Survey Components 
The electronic survey was developed in a way to ensure survey respondents’ anonymity 
and respect respondents’ time. The survey consisted of 42 items, but varied in length based on 
responses from survey respondents (see Appendix A for survey items). Each respondent only 
answered questions that were relevant to his or her own reported experience. The survey was 
divided into three sections: (I) demographic and eligibility information, (II) CR evaluation 
components and methodology, and (III) opinions/open-ended questions about how CR 
evaluations are conducted today.  
Part I of the survey included a short demographic questionnaire and questions pertaining 
to the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the study. Specifically, survey respondents were asked 
about age, gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as the state in which they practice. Respondents 
were also asked about their forensic mental health training, including continuing education, 
graduate degree, pre-doctoral internship (if applicable), residency (if applicable) post-doctoral 
training (if applicable), fellowship (if applicable), and board certification. In regards to eligibility 
criteria, participants were asked if they were licensed in psychology or board certified in 
psychiatry, and whether had ever conducted a CR evaluation as a professional (non-student). 
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Participants were also asked to estimate the percentage of their professional caseload that 
consists of forensic clients since 2008. Only respondents who reported more than 10% of their 
caseload with forensic clients were invited to continue. Those respondents who met study 
eligibility criteria in Part I were invited to complete the remainder of the survey. Those who did 
not meet participation eligibility criteria were thanked for their time and not allowed to continue 
to Part II of the survey. 
Items in Part II focused on CR evaluation procedures, components, and methodology. 
Survey respondents were asked about the approximate number of CR evaluations conducted in 
their lifetime, number of CR evaluations conducted this year, time between date of offense and 
evaluation date of most recent CR evaluation, whether a recognized psychiatric diagnosis was 
included in their most recent CR evaluation, and they sorts of third-party information relied upon 
in their most recent CR evaluation.  In Part III of the survey, participants were given the 
opportunity to provide open-ended comments about current CR evaluation practices, concerns, 
and suggestions. 
Before taking the survey, respondents were provided with definitions for survey terms 
that could potentially cause confusion. Items on the electronic survey were written to avoid 
jargon whenever possible. Pilot testing was conducted using eight volunteer graduate students 
with forensic assessment experience (though not necessarily experience with CR evaluations). 
Pilot testing was utilized to calculate approximate survey completion time and ensure item 
clarity. Results from the pilot tests suggested that survey completion time would be 
approximately 12 minutes. Upon the suggestion of four pilot testers (50%), three survey items 
were modified to increase clarity, utility, and brevity.11  
                                                        
11 Pilot testers suggested that the 7-point Likert scale responses for collateral documents that FMHP typically have 
access to be discarded and replaced with a categorical option (yes/no), stating that answering the question on a 
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3.3 Procedure 
This research was conducted throughout the United States using an anonymous 
“Qualtrics” survey. All data were collected online between January and May 2014. Survey 
respondents were initially recruited through American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 
(AAPL), American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS), American Academy of Forensic 
Psychology (AAFP), and American Board of Forensic Psychology (ABFP). Email invitations to 
participate in the survey were sent to members of AAPL [200 invitations], AAFP [31 
invitations], and ABFP [186 invitations] using membership information publicly available on 
each organization’s respective website. All non-student members of AP-LS were invited to 
participate through the AP-LS electronic mailing list [941 invitations]. In accordance with AP-
LS research solicitation policies, access to electronic mailing list was granted for a fee of $150.   
Unfortunately, it was not possible to send an email invitation to all AAPL members, as 
was previously planned. Due to changes in AAPL policy and administration, access to the AAPL 
listserv for research solicitation in the field of psychology was not permitted. Despite this 
unexpected denial of listserv access, 200 AAPL members were contacted using membership 
information publically available on the AAPL website. As mentioned above, because initial 
recruitment did not yield sufficient survey respondents, particularly psychiatrists, a modification 
of research solicitation practices was submitted and approved by the Drexel IRB to recruit 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Likert scale was problematic because (1) the highly context-specific nature of CR evaluations made it difficult to 
provide a meaningful Likert-type answer, (2) answering based on a Likert-scale felt confusing to survey takers, and 
(3) presenting the questions with Likert-scale response options required each question to be presented individually to 
survey takers (rather than corresponding with whether items referring to their most recent evaluation), which added 
an additional 3–5 minutes onto the survey. Upon consultation with pilot testers and my advisor, questions referring 
to typical use of collateral items were changed to categorical (yes/no), rather than Likert (NeverAlways). 
Similarly, questions referring to typical collateral interviews were also adjusted to include categorical (yes/no) 
response options. Lastly, upon the suggestion of pilot-testers, survey respondents were asked whether they felt they 
have enough guidance from the field for conducting CR evaluations (yes/no), rather than given Likert-scale response 
choices. 
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psychiatrists using information obtained through the American Board of Psychiatry and 
Neurology, Inc. (ABPN) verifyCERT website.  
All electronic invitations to participate included information about the research study, 
eligibility requirements, the investigators, and consent procedures, as well as a link and 
directions to access the electronic survey (see Appendix B for Invitation to Participate in 
Research). Participation criteria were clearly stated in the email. Survey respondents were 
informed that they would receive no compensation for participation, but could elect to enter into 
a separate drawing for a $50 Amazon.com gift card. Two gift cards were awarded, one to a 
psychologist and one to a psychiatrist. The survey was officially closed to potential participants 
on May 30, 2014.   
4. Results 
 A primary focus of this research was to investigate differences in evaluation components 
and methodology between forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. Preliminary analyses 
conducted to investigate demographic differences between groups revealed significant 
differences relating to gender and race (See Table 4, p. 39). Specifically, there were significantly 
more female psychology respondents than psychiatry respondents, χ2 (1, n = 134) = 8.97, p = 
.003, phi = .27 (small). Additionally, a Fisher’s Exact Test (conducted because several cells had 
a minimum expected cell frequency of fewer than 5) indicated a significant association between 
race and professional discipline, p = .002, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .31 (medium). The groups 
did not differ significantly based on age. Although there were significantly fewer female 
psychiatrists than female psychologists, it appears that the proportion of female psychiatrists in 
this sample mirrors that of the population (see Price, Recupero, Strong, & Gutheil, 2004). 
According to Price and colleagues (2004), estimates of the number of women in forensic 
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psychiatry range from 10% to 25%. As such, the number of female psychiatrists in the present 
survey (21%) appears to be representative of the population and is not expected to artificially 
influence survey results. Current and reliable statistics regarding the racial and ethnic 
composition of each profession were not available, so it was not possible to evaluate the 
sample’s racial representativeness compared to the population at large. 
Table 4. Demographic Comparison Between Groups 
Demographics 
 
Psychologists 
(n = 87) 
Psychiatrists 
(n = 48) 
 Comparison Between Groups 
 
Age (in years) 
  M = 52.75 
SD = 12.18 
  M = 53.67 
SD = 15.86 
t (133) = -0.38, p = 0.71, eta 
squared = .001  
Gender*   
χ2 (1, n = 134) = 8.97, p = .003, 
phi = .27 (small)  
Male 44 (51%) 37 (78%)  
Female 43 (49%) 10 (21%)  
Race*   
p = .002, Fisher’s Exact Test, 
phi = .31 (medium) 
Caucasian 85 (98%) 38 (80%)  
African 
American 
  0 (0%)   2 (4%)  
Asian   1 (1%)   3 (6%)  
Hispanic   1 (1%)   1 (2%)  
Other   0 (0%)   3 (6%)  
*Indicates statistical significance, p < .05. 
4.1 Components of the CR Evaluation 
4.1.1 Medical Records  
Survey respondents were asked whether they “typically” had access to the medical 
records of the examinee when conducting CR evaluations. The majority of survey respondents 
endorsed typically having access to medical records (83.2%). Contrary to hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 1A), a Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) found 
no significant association between psychiatrists’ reported typical access to medical records and 
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psychologists’ access to medical records for CR evaluations, χ2 (1, n = 119) = 2.80, p = .09, phi = 
.18 (small). Similarly, there was no significant association between professional discipline and 
access to medical records in respondents’ most recent CR evaluation, χ2 (1, n = 119) = .228, p = 
.63, phi = .06 (Hypothesis 1C). Across disciplines, slightly fewer respondents (73.9%) reported 
having access to medical records in their most recent CR evaluation than they typically do 
(83.2%). 
4.1.2 Psychiatric Records 
The vast majority (95%) of survey respondents reported typically having access to 
psychiatric records when conducting CR evaluations. It was hypothesized that significantly more 
forensic psychiatrists than psychologists would report typically having access to psychiatric 
records (Hypothesis 1B). Because so few respondents endorsed not having access to psychiatric 
records, a Chi-square analysis could not be conducted because the minimum expected cell 
frequency assumption was violated. Instead, a Fisher’s Exact Test was performed and, contrary 
to hypotheses, found no significant association between professional discipline and typical 
access to psychiatric records, p = .10 (FET), phi = .16 (small). Across disciplines, slightly fewer 
respondents (81.5%) reported having access to psychiatric records in their most recent CR 
evaluation. Here too, contrary to hypotheses, results from a Chi-square test for independence 
(with Yate’s Continuity Correction) suggest no significant association between professional 
discipline and access to psychiatric records in most recent evaluation, χ2 (1, n = 119) = 2.41, p = 
.12, phi = .17 (small) (Hypothesis 1D).  
4.1.3 Other Collateral Records 
Although no specific hypotheses were made about the remaining collateral documents 
included in the survey, reported access to each collateral document was analyzed for differences 
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between professional disciplines (See Table 5, p. 41). Results suggest that psychiatrists reported 
typically having significantly more access to newspaper accounts, χ2 (1, n = 119) = 6.04, p = .01, 
phi = .24 (small), and psychologists reported significantly more access to previous mental health 
provider records, p = .001, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .32  (medium). 
Table 5. Typical Access to “Other” Collateral Records  
* Indicates statistical significance, p < .05. 
4.1.4 Collateral Interviews 
The majority of survey respondents (60.7%) reported including information obtained 
from a collateral interview in their most recent CR evaluation. When asked about the number of 
collateral interviews conducted during their most recent CR evaluation, responses ranged from 1 
to 15 collateral interviews (M = 2.65, SD =2.01, mode = 3). An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the mean number of collateral interviews in most recent CR evaluation 
between psychologists and psychiatrists (Hypothesis 2B). Contrary to hypotheses, there was no 
significant difference in number of collateral interviews for psychologists (M = 2.38, SD = 1.06) 
Collateral 
Records 
Psychologists 
(n = 79) 
Psychiatrists 
(n = 40) 
Total 
(n = 119) 
Comparison Between Groups 
Police 
Transcripts 
75 (94.9%) 39 (97.5%) 
114 
(95.8%) 
p = .66, Fisher’s Exact Test, 
phi = .06  
Confessions 56 (70.9%) 31 (77.5%) 87 (73.1%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = .30, p = .58, 
phi = .07 
Court Transcripts 37 (46.8%) 24 (60.0%) 61 (51.3%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = 1.35, p = 
.25, phi =.12 
School Records 27 (34.2%) 19 (47.5%) 46 (38.7%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = 1.47, p = 
.23, phi = .13 
IEP 24 (30.4%) 17 (42.5%) 41 (34.5%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = 1.23, p = 
.27, phi = .12 
Juvenile 
Placement 
Records 
22 (27.8%) 8 (20%) 30 (25.2%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = .51, p = .48, 
phi = .09 
Probation 
Records 
28 (35.4%) 10 (25.0%) 38 (31.9%) 
χ2 (1, n = 119) = .90, p = .34, 
phi = .11 
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and psychiatrists (M = 3.32, SD = 3.14); t (69) = -1.25, p = .22. The magnitude of the differences 
in means (mean difference = -.84, 95% CI: -2.23 to .55) was very small (eta squared = .02).  
Survey respondents who endorsed typically conducting collateral interviews as part of 
CR evaluations were asked specifically about the parties they typically interview (See Table 6, p. 
42). Respondents reported conducting collateral interviews with family members of the 
defendant the most (87%), followed by interviews with previous treatment providers (67%), and 
the referring attorney (67%).  
Survey respondents were also given the opportunity to provide an open-ended response 
and describe collateral interviews that they conduct within a CR evaluation. Twenty-one 
participants provided open-ended responses specifying additional third-party collateral contacts, 
which included friends, neighbors, probation officers, “chief attorney on each side,” police, 
prosecution, significant relationships, “teachers—only if it is a juvenile in school,” co-workers or 
supervisors, “person who had most meaningful contact with defendant around time of events,” 
current providers (if hospitalized), and arresting officer/s. Additionally, one respondent stated, “I 
try to interview as many persons as I think are involved / relevant; however, getting in touch with 
those persons can be very challenging—especially surviving victims or witnesses.” 
Table 6. Collateral Interviews Typically Conducted (Hypothesis 2A) (no significant findings) 
Collateral Source 
 
Psychologists 
(n = 74) 
Psychiatrists 
(n = 35) 
Total 
(n = 109) 
Comparison Between Groups 
Defendant’s 
Family 
63 (85.1%) 32 (91.4%) 95 (87.2%) p = .54, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi 
= .09 (very small) 
Witness to the 
Offense 
44 (59%) 25 (71.4%) 69 (63.1%) χ2 (1, n = 109) = 1.47, p = .29, 
phi = .12 (small) 
Jail/Prison 
Personnel 
47 (54.0%) 23 (47.9%) 70 (51.9%) χ2 (1, n = 109) = 0.5, p = .99, 
phi =.02 (very small) 
Referring 
Attorney 
52 (70.3%) 21 (60.0%) 73 (67.0%) χ2 (1, n = 109) = 1.13, p = .29, 
phi = .10 (small) 
Defendant’s 
Significant Other 
45 (60.8%) 27 (77.1%) 72 (66.1%) χ2 (1, n = 109) = 2.83, p = .09, 
phi = .16 (small) 
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4.1.5 Inclusion of a Recognized Psychiatric Disorder 
As can be seen in Table 7, 97.5% of psychiatrist reported typically including a recognized 
psychiatric diagnosis, compared to only 82.1% of psychologists. Consistent with hypotheses, a 
Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated a significant 
relationship between professional discipline and typically including a recognized psychiatric 
diagnosis in criminal responsibility evaluations, χ2 (1, n = 118) = 4.38, p = .04, with significantly 
more psychiatrists typically including a recognized psychiatric diagnosis than psychologists. The 
effect size for this finding was small .22 (phi). Although there was a statistically significant 
relationship between professional discipline and typically including a psychiatric diagnosis in CR 
evaluations, no significant association was found between professional discipline and inclusion 
of a psychiatric diagnosis in most recent CR evaluation, χ2 (1, n = 118) = 1.78, p = .18, phi = .15 
(small) (Hypothesis 3).  
Table 7. Inclusion of a Recognized Psychiatric Disorder 
 
 
Previous Tx 
Providers 
49 (66.2%) 24 (68.6%) 73 (67.0%) χ2 (1, n = 109) = .06, p = .81, 
phi = .02 (very small) 
Teacher 6 (8.1%) 5 (14.3%) 11 (10.1%) p = .33, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi 
= .10 (small) 
 Frequency (%) Comparison Between Groups 
Typically Include DSM 
Diagnosis* 
103 (87.3%) χ2 (1, n = 118) = 4.38, p = .04, phi =.22 
(small) 
Psychiatrists (n = 40) 39 (97.5%)  
Psychologists (n = 78) 64 (82.1%)  
DSM Diagnosis in Most 
Recent Evaluation 
100 (84.7%) χ2 (1, n = 118) = 1.78, p = .18, phi = .15 
(small) 
Psychiatrists (n = 39) 36 (92.3%)  
Psychologists (n = 79) 64 (81.0%)  
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4.1.6 Testing 
Respondents were asked to indicate which psychological assessments they typically use 
when conducting a CR evaluation and which assessments they used in their most recent CR 
evaluation. Results suggest that the MMPI-2, PAI, MMPI-RF, and WAIS-IV are the most 
common clinical assessment instrument “typically” used by forensic evaluators when conducting 
CR evaluations (See Table 8, p. 45). In regards to specialized forensic measures, respondents 
reported typically using the SIRS, TOMM, M-FAST, and PCL-R the most (See Table 8). 
Although the percentages were lower, the assessments most commonly used in respondents’ 
most recent evaluation were essentially the same as those “typically” used by evaluators. 
Contrary to hypotheses, there were very few significant differences between psychiatrists 
and psychologists in use of traditional and specialized assessment measures (See Table 9). A 
Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated a significant 
relationship between professional discipline and typical use of the MMPI-RF in CR evaluations, 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 4.13, p = .04, phi = .24 (small), with significantly more psychologists “typically” 
using the MMPI-RF than psychiatrists. On the other hand, psychiatrists reported typically using 
the MMSE significantly more than psychologists, χ2 (1, n = 92) = 11.43, p = .001, phi = .38 
(medium). No other significant differences in test use were observed. 
In addition to the assessment measures explicitly listed in the survey, respondents were 
given the opportunity to write-in other assessments they have used when conducting CR 
evaluations. Respondents reported using a variety of other psychological assessments, including  
Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-Second Edition (ABAS), Brief Neuropsychological 
Cognitive Examination (BNCE), Booklet Category Test (2nd ed.) (BCT), Clinician-Administered 
PTSD Scale (CAPS), Detailed Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress (DAPS), Dementia Rating 
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Scale (DRS), Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised (ECSTR), Geriatric Depression 
Scale, the Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK), Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (2nd ed.) 
(KBIT-2), the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA), Repeatable Battery for the Assessment 
of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS), Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
Disorders (SCID-I), Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders 
(SCID-II), Structured Interview for DSM-IV Personality (SIDP-IV), Trail Making Test (TMT), 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Vineland-II), Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, and Wechsler 
Memory Test (WMS). 
Table 8. Combined Use of Psychological Assessments in CR Evaluations  
Psychological Assessment TYPICALLY USE (n = 92) 
MOST RECENT 
EVALUATION (n = 92) 
Clinical Assessment 
Instruments 
  
MMPI-2 41 (30.4%) 25 (18.5%) 
PAI 31 (23.0%) 12 (8.9%) 
MMPI-RF 30 (22.2%) 16 (11.6%) 
WAIS-IV 29 (21.5%) 12 (8.9%) 
MMSE 24 (17.7%) 13 (9.6%) 
WASI-II 12 (8.9%)   3 (2.2%) 
WASI   8 (5.9%)   1 (0.7%) 
WRAT-4   8 (5.9%)   2 (1.5%) 
MCMI-III   7 (5.2%)   2 (1.5%) 
Rorschach   7 (5.2%)   5 (3.7%) 
BDI-II   6 (4.4%)   3 (2.2%) 
SASSI-3   4 (3%)   1 (0.7%) 
BAI   3 (2.2%)   2 (1.5%) 
SCL-90-R   2 (1.5%)   2 (1.5%) 
TAT   2 (1.5%)   1 (0.7%) 
SB-V   1 (0.7%)   0 (0%) 
BSI   1 (0.7%)   0 (0%) 
WJ-III-ACH   1 (0.7%)   1 (0.7%) 
WJ-III   0 (0%)   0 (0%) 
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Table 9. Use of Psychological Assessments between Professional Disciplines 
Specialized Measures   
SIRS-2 43 (31.9%) 24 (17.8%) 
TOMM 41 (30.4%) 10 (7.4%) 
M-FAST 30 (22.2%)   8 (5.2%) 
PCL-R 21 (15.6%)   7 (5.2%) 
VIP 17 (12.6%)   6 (4.4%) 
SIMS 14 (10.4%) 5 (3.7%) 
R-CRAS 11 (8.1%)   6 (4.4%) 
Rey 15 10 (7.4%)   3 (2.2%) 
VSVT   1 (0.7%)   0 (0%) 
PPI-R   0 (0%)   0 (0%) 
 
Psychologists 
(n = 62) 
Psychiatrists 
(n = 30) 
Comparison Between Professional 
Disciplines 
Typically Use    
MMPI-2 25 (40.3%) 16 (53.3%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 0.91, p = .34, phi = .12 
(small) 
PAI 20 (32.3%) 11 (36.7%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 0.03, p = .85, phi = .04 
(very small) 
*MMPI-RF 24 (40.3%)   5 (16.7%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 4.13, p = .04, phi = .24 
(small) 
WAIS-IV 22 (35.5%)   7 (23.3%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = .88, p = .35, phi = .12 
(small) 
*MMSE   9 (14.5%) 15 (50.0%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 11.43, p = .001, phi = 
.38 (medium) 
SIRS-2 31 (50.0%) 12 (40.0%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = .46, p = .50, phi = .09 
(very small) 
TOMM 28 (45.2%) 13 (43.3%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = .00, p = 1.0, phi = .02 
(very small) 
M-FAST 23 (37.1%)   7 (23.3%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 1.17, p = .28, phi =-.14 
(small) 
PCL-R 10 (16.1%) 11 (36.7%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 3.75, p = .05, phi =.23 
(small) 
Most Recent Eval.    
MMPI-2 16 (25.8%) 9 (30%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = .03, p = .86, phi = .04 
(very small) 
PAI 9 (14.5%) 3 (10.0%) 
p = .75, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .06 
(very small) 
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* Indicates statistical significance, p < .05 
4.2 Time Delay 
 Respondents were asked to report the date of their most recent CR evaluation and the 
date of the alleged offense involved in the case.12 The amount of time that elapsed between 
offense date and evaluation date was calculated and varied widely, ranging from .37 months to 
142.53 months. The mean delay between offense date and evaluation date in respondents’ most 
recent CR evaluation was 9.9 months (SD = 15.1). There was no significant difference in time 
elapsed in most recent CR evaluation between psychologists (M = 9.75 months, SD = 17.58) and 
psychiatrists (M = 10.21 months, SD = 7.95); t (120) = -.16, p = .88, eta squared < .01 (small). 
 In addition to reporting the time delay from their most recent CR evaluation, survey 
respondents were also asked to report the longest time that they recall elapsing between an 
offense date and the date of the CR evaluation that they conducted. Responses, across 
disciplines, varied widely, ranging from 1 month to 240 months (20 years) (M = 41.69, SD = 
43.50). The most common longest-ever delay reported (mode) was 12 months (15.6% of 
respondents), followed closely by 24 months (14.8% of respondents). Consistent with hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 5), there was no significant difference in longest recalled time delay between 
                                                        
12 Alternatively, respondents were given the option to report the estimated amount of time (in months) between 
offense date and evaluation date (without providing the actual dates). 
MMPI-RF 13 (21.0%) 3 (10.0%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 1.01, p = .31, phi = .14 
(small) 
WAIS-IV 10 (16.1%) 2 (6.7%) 
p = .32, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .13 
(small) 
*MMSE 5 (8.1%) 8 (26.7%) 
p = .03, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .25 
(small) 
SIRS-2 19 (30.6%) 5 (16.7%) 
χ2 (1, n = 92) = 1.39, p = .24, phi = .15 
(small) 
TOMM 7 (11.3%) 3 (10.0%) p = 1.00, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .02 
M-FAST 6 (9.7%) 2 (6.7%) p = 1.00, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .05  
PCL-R 4 (6.5%) 3 (10.0%) p = .68, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .06  
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psychologists (M = 42.83, SD = 44.49) and psychiatrists (M = 39.44, SD = 41.91); t (120) = .41, 
p = .69. The magnitude of the difference in means (mean difference = 3.39, 95% CI: -13.18 to 
19.95) was very small (eta squared = .001). 
 Respondents were given the opportunity to express concerns about the time delay 
between offense date and evaluation date in an open-ended question. Of the 135 respondents 
who provided an open-ended response to this question, 127 (94%) reported at least some concern 
about the time delay. Concerns about the time delay stemmed from multiple reasons, ranging 
from cognitive concerns to expert credibility concerns. For example, the majority of respondents 
noted concerns about longer time delays negatively influencing defendants’ ability to give an 
accurate account of the events. A large proportion of respondents also noted that a significant 
time delay inhibits the ability to observe a defendant’s functioning/symptom presentation near 
the time of the offense. Other respondents mentioned concerns about the loss of 
information/memories from collateral interviews and potentially destruction of collateral 
documents. Coming from a slightly different perspective, a few respondents noted that lengthy 
time delays equate to significantly more work and can add “25–30 hours” of document review to 
an evaluation. Relatedly, one respondent noted a concern that long-time delays decrease a jury’s 
confidence in his/her ability to assess mental state at the time of offense and, thus, reduce his/her 
effectiveness. 
4.3 Experience and Abilities 
Survey respondents reported vast differences in experience conducting CR evaluations, 
both in terms of number of years of experience and number of career CR evaluations. The 
number of career CR evaluations estimated by psychiatrists ranged from 4 to 1500 (M = 182.43, 
SD = 333.29; mode = 100) (see Figure 1, p. 50). Also varying widely, the number of career CR 
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evaluations reported by psychologists ranged from 4 to 4000 (M = 365.17, SD = 649.39; modes = 
50 & 100).13 Comparatively, psychologists reported significantly more career CR evaluations 
than psychiatrists, t (126) = 2.08, p = .04, eta squared =.03 (small). Given the wide-range of 
career CR evaluations reported, the frequency distributions from each discipline were analyzed 
further. Analyses revealed that two responses from psychologists (reporting 3000 and 4000 
career evaluations) were over three standard deviations from the mean. Despite the statistical 
improbability of these estimations, it is difficult to determine whether they are actual outliers that 
should be discarded or whether they represent accurate (albeit very high) estimations of career 
evaluations conducted by very experienced psychologists. This determination is made more 
difficult considering several psychologists reported over 40 years of experience conducting CR 
evaluations, which could contribute to a very high number of lifetime CR evaluations. Given the 
exploratory nature of this project, the above analyses were re-run excluding the two participants 
whose responses were over three standard deviations from the mean. After these respondents 
were excluded, there was no significant difference between psychologists (M = 284.19, SD = 
413.75) and psychiatrists (M = 182.43, SD = 333.29) in number of career criminal responsibility 
evaluations reported t (126) = 1.43, p = .16, eta squared = .02 (small). The possibility of extreme 
career CR evaluation values influencing study findings was considered in all further analyses 
evaluating career CR evaluations.14  
With respect to number of evaluations conducted in the past year, both psychiatrists and 
psychologists reported conducting between 0 and 150 evaluations (psychiatrists: M = 11.57, SD 
= 25.08, mode = 5; psychologists: M = 15.05, SD = 25.65, mode = 0) (see Figure 2, p. 50). There 
was no significant difference in number of evaluations conducted in the last year between 
                                                        
13 Results revealed multiple modes in this distribution.  
14 All analyses involving career CR evaluations were conducted twice: once including all of the item responses, and 
once excluding those responses which were more than three standard deviations from the mean.  
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psychiatrists and psychologists, t (128) = .75, p = .46, eta squared <.01 (small). In addition to 
significantly more career CR evaluations, psychologists also reported significantly more years of 
experience (M = 19.42 years, SD = 11.56) than psychiatrists (M = 14.12 years, SD = 10.33); 
t(116) = 2.32, p = .02, eta squared =.04 (small). This difference was not statistically significant 
when artificially dichotomized into those with more than 10 years of experience and those with 
less than 10 years of experience for certain analyses described below, χ2 (1, n = 118) = 1.55, p = 
.22, phi = .14 (small).   
 
Figure 1.
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Figure 2.  
 
Concerning specific types of CR evaluations (i.e., insanity, diminished capacity/mens rea, 
automatism, and GBMI), respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of their total CR 
experience made up by each type of evaluation. A large percentage of respondents (29%) 
reported that insanity evaluations made up the entirety of their CR evaluation experience, 
followed by (14%) of respondents who reported that insanity evaluations made up 95% of their 
CR experience. As expected, insanity (M = 77.42, SD = 29.24) was the most common evaluation 
type, followed by diminished capacity/mens rea (M = 15.33, SD = 23.77), GBMI (M = 4.44, SD 
= 14.86), and automatism (M = 1.08, SD = 8.85). Additionally, a small percentage of respondents 
reported conducting “other” (M = 4.06, SD = 11.99) types of CR evaluations, including 
involuntary intoxication, “legal unconsciousness,” “mistake of fact as to consent,” soundness of 
mind, and “juvenile version of insanity.” Five respondents wrote in “competency to stand 
trial/proceed” as a type of CR evaluation.  
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4.3.1 Confidence in Ability to Conduct CR Evaluations 
Several analyses were conducted to investigate whether less experienced forensic mental 
health professionals would report feeling less confident in their ability to conduct accurate CR 
evaluations than professionals with more experience (Hypothesis 6). As previously planned, the 
relationship between experience level (dichotomized into two groups: those with more than 10 
years of experience and those with less than 10 years of experience) and confidence in ability to 
conduct accurate CR evaluations was investigated using point-biserial correlation (rpb). 
Assumptions were evaluated before conducting the correlation analyses and found the 
dichotomous experience level groups were substantially unequal (more than 10 years of 
experience: n = 73; less than 10 years of experience: n = 31).15 Results from the point-biserial 
correlation suggest there was an extremely small, non-significant relationship between the two 
variables, r = -.08, n = 104, p = .44 (r2 = .006, which suggests that the percentage of variance 
shared by these variables is .6%). Because of the unequal sample sizes, r was corrected using the 
formula recommended by Becker (1986).16 Even after the correction, rC was still extremely small 
(rC = .08), suggesting that there is not much of a relationship between dichotomized years of 
experience and confidence in ability to conduct accurate CR evaluations.  
In consideration of unequal experience-level group sizes in the previous analysis, 
participants were artificially categorized in three more equal groups (1–10 years of experience: n 
= 32 (M = 2.59, SD = 18.56); 11–20 years of experience: n = 35 (M = 6.00, SD = .97); and 20+ 
years of experience: n = 38 (M = 6.03, SD = .82)).  A one-way between-groups ANOVA was 
                                                        
15 Assumptions for correlation include level of measurement, related pairs, independence of observation, normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity (Pallant, 2010).  
16rc  = r / √(r2 + 4pq(1-r)2), where r is the obtained point-biserial and p and q are the proportions of each of the two 
sample sizes n1 and n2 to their combined size N.   According to Becker (p. 5), “It is appropriate to correct for unequal 
sample size when populations represented by the samples can be assumed to be equally numerous.”  
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conducted to explore the impact of experience level on confidence in ability to conduct CR 
evaluations. Assumptions of random sampling, normal distribution, and homogeneity of variance 
were satisfied. Results suggested no significant difference in mean confidence ratings among the 
three experience level groups, F (2, 104) = 1.24, p = .30, eta-squared = .02 (small).  
Artificially categorizing years of experiences made the data less precise and resulted in 
substantially unequal groups of experience level during the first analysis. Because of the 
concerns with artificially categorized groups, additional analyses were run treating both variables 
(number of years of experience and confidence level on 7-point Likert scale) as continuous. 
Preliminary analyses were performed to assess the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity, all of which were satisfied. Here, too, the relationship between number of 
years of experience and confidence in ability to conduct CR evaluations was not significant and 
extremely small, r = .05, n = 104, p =.62, (r2 = .003).  
 Because CR evaluations can be relatively rare, it was thought that perhaps estimated 
number of career CR evaluations conducted (rather than years of experience) would correlate 
more strongly with confidence to conduct accurate CR evaluations. As such, the relationship 
between estimated number of CR evaluations conducted over respondents’ careers and 
confidence level (as measured on a 7-point Likert scale) was investigated using Pearson product-
moment correlation. Preliminary analyses were performed and the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity were satisfied. There was small positive correlation between the 
two variables, r = .24 (small), n = 116, p = .01, with higher number of career CR evaluations 
associated with higher levels of confidence in ability to conduct accurate CR evaluations.17 This 
finding was similar and even more statistically significant when the analysis was run excluding 
the two career criminal responsibility evaluation outliers, r = .28 (small), n = 114, p < .01. 
                                                        
17 Cohen (1988, p. 79–81) suggests that a correlation coefficient of .24 falls within the “small” category.  
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Professional discipline did not appear to influence confidence rating, as no significant difference 
was found between psychiatrists (n = 40; M = 6.18, SD = .90) and psychologists (n = 78; M = 
5.92, SD = .80) in confidence conducting accurate criminal responsibility evaluations (as 
measured by a 7-point Likert scale), t(116) = -1.55, p = .13, eta squared = .02 (small). 
 4.3.2 Experience and Need for Guidance in CR Evaluations 
 Survey respondents were asked whether they felt there was enough guidance from the 
field (forensic psychology and/or psychiatry) regarding how to conduct CR evaluations. Across 
disciplines, 101 respondents (87.8%) said “yes” they felt there was sufficient guidance, 
compared to 14 respondents (12.2%) who reported they felt there was not enough guidance from 
the field. There was no significant association between professional discipline and opinions 
about the need for more CR evaluation guidance, p = .14, Fisher’s Exact Test, phi = .15 (small).  
All respondents were given the opportunity to explain their opinions regarding more 
guidance for CR evaluations. Illustrative responses included: “yes [there is sufficient guidance], 
but you need to seek it out”; “Yes, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law NGRI Practice 
Guidelines”; “Many professionals don’t take advantage of it”; “Conferences with attorneys as 
well as mental health professionals would be useful”; “I could always benefit from additional 
advice. It is a complex endeavor with a mix of moral, legal, clinical implications that are difficult 
to sort out”; “I am from the era forensic psychology before the inception of specialty programs in 
forensics. As such, I have had to obtain and look for ways to instruct myself and keep abreast of 
the field’s best practices in performing MSO evaluations”; and “If psychologists have had 
specialized training and supervision by a forensically qualified psychologist, there is enough 
guidance from the field. But many people are doing MSO evals without that—which I think is 
problematic.”  
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 Independent-samples t-tests were used to determine whether those who thought more 
guidance was needed and those who did not think more guidance was needed differed 
significantly in terms of experience (Hypothesis 7). The number of years of experience between 
those who thought more guidance was needed (M = 21.14 years, SD = 11.68) and those who did 
not think more guidance was needed (M = 17.60 years, SD = 11.68) did not differ significantly; 
t(100) = -1.05, p = .30, eta squared = .01 (small). Similarly, there was no significant difference 
in number of career CR evaluations and opinion of whether more guidance was needed about CR 
evaluations (more guidance needed: M = 202.86 career evaluations; SD = 5.22; no more 
guidance needed: M = 333.89 career evaluations; SD = 598.73); t (111) = .78, p = .44, eta 
squared =.01 (small).18 
4.3.3 Experience and Knowledge of Legal Standards 
The relationship between experience conducting CR evaluations and reported knowledge 
of the appropriate legal standards (as measured by a 7-point Likert scale) was investigated using 
Pearson product-moment correlation (Hypothesis 8). Contrary to hypotheses, there was a small, 
non-significant relationship between the two variables, r = .15 (small), n = 104, p = .12, with 
greater experience level associated with greater self-reported knowledge of legal standards. 
Experience and knowledge of legal standards was also investigated using number of career 
criminal responsibility evaluations as a representation of experience. Here, there was a small, 
statistically significant correlation between number of evaluations and knowledge of legal 
standards, r = .19, n = 116, p = .04, with higher number of career CR evaluations associated with 
self-reported greater knowledge of legal standards. This relationship was statistically significant 
even when career CR evaluation outliers were excluded, r = .22 (small), n = 114, p = .02. 
                                                        
18 Additionally, this same analysis was run excluding the career CR evaluation outliers. Here too, there was no 
significant difference in number of career criminal responsibility evaluations and opinion of whether more guidance 
was needed, t (109) = -.57, p = .57, eta squared <.01 (small)). 
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4.3.4 Experience and Reported Ability to Detect Exaggeration  
Survey respondents were asked whether they felt they were able to detect when an 
examinee was feigning or exaggerating symptoms of mental illness. The vast majority (96.6%) 
of respondents reported that they felt they were able to detect feigning or exaggerating 
symptoms; only four respondents (3.4%) reported that they did not feel they were able to detect 
when an examinee was feigning or exaggerating. Survey respondents were given the opportunity 
to explain what they do if they suspect an individual is exaggerating his or her psychiatric 
symptoms during a CR evaluations. Interestingly, every respondent (n = 135) provided an open-
ended response to this question.  
Responses generally included at least one (often more) of the following methods for 
handling suspected exaggeration of symptoms: (1) Use response-style/malingering testing (e.g., 
SIRS, M-FAST) (n = 47); (2) Confront the examinee (n = 19); (3) Rely upon collateral 
documentation and interviews (n = 27); (4) Tell the defense attorney (n = 4); (5) Return for a 
second interview and more behavioral observation (n = 7); (6) Ask open-ended questions about 
the symptoms (n = 8); and/or (7) Comment about the suspected exaggeration in the report (n = 
13). See Table 10 (p. 56) for notable responses to this question. 
Table 10. Selected Responses Regarding Suspected Exaggeration of Symptoms  
Topic Response 
Testing 
“I ALWAYS use some measure of malingering, typically the 
SIRS.” 
 
“I almost always use a structured objective measure, for example, 
the SIRS-2. The exceptions are when the person is from another 
culture and doesn’t speak English, or is too uncooperative to take 
the test…” 
 
“I routinely consider feigning/malingering as a differential and 
assess response style as a matter of course. I believe this is 
required (see SGFP), and I do not think examiners should only 
assess for feigning when they have a sense that the subject is 
feigning.” 
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Confrontation “I usually tell them I suspect it. Encourage them to be honest.” 
 
“Never bring up the issue directly, unless it is the very last thing 
you bring up--in which case, do so in the context of asking them to 
“clarify the record” . . . or “tell the rest of the story.” 
 “Challenge at the end of the evaluation.” 
 
“First, I confront them with the hope that they will respond 
truthfully…” 
 “I call him or her out on it.” 
 
“Although Resnick recommends confronting the patient with the 
fact of exaggeration, I have had little luck with such approach.”  
 
“I will advise that it is not to their benefit to exaggerate if I think 
that is going on.” 
Open-Ended 
Questions 
“Ask lots of open-ended questions to elicit more detail on reported 
symptoms.” 
 
“Get the person to talk A LOT about the symptoms. If they are 
exaggerating, their account will change and tends to become 
either silly or clearly not accurate in some other way.” 
Tell Attorney 
“Consult with the defense attorney and ask him/her to instruct the 
client to be honest.” 
Collateral 
Information 
“Lots of collateral information is key. Malingering measures, not 
as much, although I do use them sometimes.” 
Return for 2nd 
Interview 
“This is why seeing the person more than once is often essential—
2 samples of behavior.” 
 
“Generation of evidence for the argument or against malingering 
come from multiple attempts of addressing inconsistency with the 
defendant.” 
Comment in Report 
“I also comment in the report about any reservations that I have 
about the veracity of the defendant’s self-report information and 
the witness reports and let the court know that I weighed this 
information before coming to my conclusion.” 
 
“I simply point out language and behavior the defendant used 
where one may infer the possibility of exaggeration.” 
 
“I generally do not give definitive opinions about malingering in 
the absence of substantial support for malingering, such as a 
video or audio recording of the defendant making an explicit 
statement that played up the symptoms in order to get an NGRI.” 
Other 
“I will often come back to the unit in the evening to observe the 
defendant in an unobtrusive way.” 
 
“Patience is everything. Slow repeated though re-phrased 
inquiries that can seem off topic at first. Do some provocative 
questioning, such as stating something that is not true, but they 
would likely refute.”  
 
“I also push for a hospital/observational admission to get 24 hour 
monitoring in order to get as much collateral as possible.” 
 “Usually insist on inpatient observation.” 
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“Discount much of what they tell me as far as their version, unless 
there is independent verification from the time of the offense.” 
 “Fee-evaluate.” 
 
“I am also cognizant of the fact that a defendant may be 
malingering, but could still have been insane at the time of the 
offense.” 
 
“I begin every examination in a forensic setting assuming there is 
some exaggeration or fabrication.” 
 
“In most cases, the defendant’s account doesn’t meet the level of 
concern for criminal responsibility matters anyway, even if there 
is exaggeration…” 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Survey Findings and Implications 
 Although mental health professionals have conducted CR evaluations for decades, 
“relatively limited” (Packer, 2009, p. 59) empirical research has examined the specific 
methodologies employed by mental health professionals when conducting CR evaluations. To 
address this gap in understanding, the current study surveyed forensic psychologists and 
psychiatrists nationwide, examining components of CR evaluations, time delay between offense 
date and evaluation date, and the relationship between experience and opinions about CR 
evaluations.  
 5.1.1 Components of Criminal Responsibility Evaluations 
A primary focus of this research was to investigate differences in evaluation components 
and methodology between forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. Contrary to hypotheses, there 
were very few significant differences between professional disciplines relating to reliance upon 
collateral records or collateral interviews. This overall lack of significant differences between 
professions may, in itself, be significant because it suggests that there are relatively few 
differences between psychiatrists and psychologists regarding CR report components, at least in 
this study. The majority of survey respondents reported typically having access to psychiatric 
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records (95%) and medical records (83.2%) when conducting CR evaluations, and there was no 
significant difference between psychologists and psychiatrists in access to medical or psychiatric 
records. Furthermore, despite the numerous analyses investigating “typical” and “most recent” 
use of various collateral documents, only two significant differences were observed between 
professions: newspaper accounts (more psychiatrists) and previous mental health provider 
records (more psychologists). It is difficult to ascertain why significantly more psychiatrists 
would access newspaper accounts than psychologists. This difference may be a sample specific 
anomaly and not representative of psychiatrists conducting CR evaluations as a whole. On the 
other hand, it may also suggest that psychiatrists receive more high-profile or newspaper worthy 
referrals than psychologists. More research is needed into this area to better understand this 
finding.  
Also contrary to hypotheses, psychologists did not report conducting significantly more 
collateral interviews than psychiatrists. While the majority of respondents reported conducting at 
least one collateral interview in their last CR evaluation (61%), nearly 30% of respondents did 
not conduct collateral interviews. This finding is particularly concerning within the context of 
CR evaluations, where examinees have an incentive to deliberately distort information and where 
significant time may have elapsed since the date of offense. Self-reported symptoms and 
experiences may not be accurate, so the use of third-party information is generally considered to 
be a critical aspect of forensic mental health assessment in general, and especially CR 
evaluations (Melton et al., 2007). The use of third-party information increases the accuracy of 
forensic mental health assessments and is consistent with best practices (see Heilbrun, 2001; 
Melton et al., 2007).  
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It appears that the number of collateral interviews conducted and amount of third-party 
information relied upon varies widely and is likely context-dependent. The mean number of 
collateral interviews conducted across disciplines was 2.65; however, several respondents 
reported conducting as many as 15 collateral evaluations in their most recent CR evaluation. This 
finding illustrates the wide range of methodologies employed by those conducting CR 
evaluations and the differing value placed on third-party information. The most commonly 
reported collateral interviewees were family members, previous treatment providers, and the 
referring attorney. Of note, one respondent reported problems getting in touch with potential 
collateral interviewees—“especially witness and victims” – which suggests he or she attempted 
to interview these parties. This response brings up an important consideration when conducting 
collateral interviews – i.e, although third-party information is often useful, evaluators must be 
mindful of potential accuracy problems with information obtained from third-parties, which may 
include bias, suggestibility, expertise, and memory loss (Heilbrun, 2001, p. 174).  
Next, consistent with hypotheses, significantly more psychiatrists reported typically 
including a recognized psychiatric diagnosis than psychologists. However, this was not the case 
when asked about most recent evaluation, where there was no significant difference in inclusion 
of a recognized psychiatric diagnosis between psychiatrists and psychologists. Respondents were 
not given the opportunity to explain why included a psychiatric diagnosis or why they did not. 
Future research should investigate reasoning behind inclusion of a formal diagnosis and whether 
there is a trend towards inclusion of diagnoses.  
Contrary to hypotheses, there were very few significant differences between psychiatrists 
and psychologists in use of traditional and specialized assessment measures. Previous research 
has found that psychologists use testing significantly more than psychiatrists (Borum & Grisso, 
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1995; Warren et al., 2004); however, results from the current study do not support this finding. In 
regards to specific tests, significantly more psychologists reported “typically” using the MMPI-
RF than psychiatrists, and significantly more psychiatrists reported typically using the MMSE 
than psychologists. Across disciplines, the most commonly reported traditional assessments 
“typically” used were the MMPI-2, PAI, MMPI-RF, and WAIS-IV, which is largely consistent 
with previous research that found the MMPI and WAIS-R to be most commonly traditional 
measures used in criminal responsibility evaluations (Heilbrun & Collins, 1995). In regards to 
specialized measures, only 8% of respondents reported typically using the R-CRAS, a 
specialized measure designed for CR evaluations.  
Of note, respondents endorsed using numerous other measures not included in CR 
evaluations, including PTSD assessments, the SCID, adaptive behavior measures, dementia 
measures, and brief cognitive screening tools. Perhaps most concerning, several respondents 
reported using the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised (ECSTR) in CR 
evaluations, which is a specialized competence to stand trial measure and not designed for use in 
CR evaluations. This is particularly problematic because it suggests that the respondents are not 
addressing the appropriate legal standard and not using appropriate and relevant psychological 
instruments. 
5.1.2 Time Delay 
Consistent with hypotheses, there was no significant difference in reported time delay 
between psychologists and psychiatrists. Both disciplines reported lengthy time delays between 
offense date and evaluation date, with the mean delay in most recent evaluation estimated at 
nearly 10 months. Like most responses in this survey, there was a wide range of survey answers, 
ranging from a delay of only .37 months to as much as 142.53 months. When asked about the 
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longest length of time between date of offense and date of evaluation, 12 respondents reported 
time delays of over 10 years. The longest time delay reported in this study was 240 months (20 
years). Lengthy time delays are concerning because they can decrease the accuracy of the 
evaluation and may contribute to the loss of valuable information. In addition to problems 
relating to cognition and memory, respondents pointed out that lengthy time delays make it 
impossible to observe the symptom presentation of a defendant near the time of offense and 
make it difficult to access some collateral information sources (e.g., collateral interviewees 
disappear, records get lost/destroyed). Interestingly, some respondents commented that lengthy 
time delays add a significant amount of work to the evaluation. Respondents also expressed 
concerns that lengthy delays decrease their credibility because juries are skeptical of experts’ 
ability to reconstruct mental states over long periods of time. It is not known whether this jury 
skepticism is true, but it may warrant further research—especially considering the high cost of 
hiring an expert and the long hours that experts would have to spend combing through third-
party information sources to retrospectively reconstruct a mental state for an incident that 
occurred so far in the past.  
5.1.3 Experience 
Respondents reported an extremely wide range of CR evaluation experience, such that 
some respondents reported conducting as many as 4000 career CR evaluations, compared to 
others who had only ever conducted four CR evaluations. Such a large range of experience 
increased the variability of the distribution. As mentioned in the results section, two 
psychologists reported estimates of career CR evaluations that were more than three standard 
deviations above the mean. This obviously influenced the mean number of career CR evaluations 
for psychologists. In consideration of the extremely large numbers reported, the two outliers for 
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discarded and analyses relying upon this measure of experience were run two times, once with 
all of the responses included and once with the two outliers discarded. In all but one analysis, 
inclusion of the outliers did not change the statistical significance of the findings. As such, it 
appears that the extremely large reported range of career CR experience had minimal impact on 
study findings. 
As expected, insanity evaluations made up the majority of respondents’ CR experience. 
In addition to traditional types of CR evaluations, several respondents wrote-in “involuntary 
intoxication,” “legal unconsciousness,” “mistake of fact as to consent,” “soundness of mind,” 
and “juvenile version of insanity” as other types of CR evaluations they had conducted. Of 
concern, five respondents wrote in “competency to stand trial” or “competence to proceed” as a 
type of CR evaluation. This suggests that some respondents were not familiar with the relevant 
legal statutes in their jurisdiction and were not addressing the appropriate legal standard for the 
evaluation.   
As expected, experience conducting CR evaluations was positively correlated with higher 
levels of confidence in ability to conduct accurate CR evaluations and greater knowledge of legal 
standards. This seems to imply that evaluators get better at conducting accurate CR evaluations 
over time; however, open-ended comments from respondents caution that this may not always be 
the case. Several respondents noted that it is sometimes challenging to stay up-to-date with best 
practice guidelines and advancements in the field, especially outside of an academic setting. 
Contrary to hypotheses, there was not a significant association between experience level and 
opinions regarding the need for more guidance from the field about CR evaluations.   
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5.1.4 Exaggeration of Symptoms 
Respondents appeared to be very confident in their ability to detect malingering, with the 
vast majority of respondents reporting that they felt they could detect when an examinee was 
feigning or exaggerating symptoms of mental illness. When asked about techniques for dealing 
with suspected malingering, open-ended answers provided by respondents were largely 
consistent with Practice Guidelines for Forensic Mental Health Assessment (Simon & Gold, 
2004; Heilbrun, 2001; Heilbrun, DeMatteo, Holliday, & LaDuke, 2014). Techniques included 
Using psychological testing when malingering is suspected (Practice Guidelines for FMHA, 
#61), reviewing collateral information sources for information that supports or refutes 
malingering (Practice Guidelines for FMHA, #61), performing multiple interviews with the 
defendant (Practice Guidelines for FMHA, #38), and disclosing limitations of forensic opinions 
in the report (Practice Guidelines for FMHA, #42). Respondents also reported asking open-ended 
questions about the symptoms as a technique for dealing with potential malingering. 
5. 2 Limitations 
 There were several limitations to this study. First, the study had a relatively small sample 
size that consisted of significantly more psychologists than psychiatrists. The small and 
disproportionate sample size is partially attributable to inability to recruit from the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL) listserv as originally planned. Because AAPL is the 
largest and best-established professional organizations for forensic psychiatry, access to this 
listserv (rather than merely AAPL member websites) would have been ideal. In an attempt to 
compensate for the inability to recruit from the AAPL listserv, additional IRB approval was 
received to recruit from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN). This 
additional recruitment strategy garnered 38 more psychiatrist respondents, which equated to a 
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roughly 11% response rate. The small sample size is also attributable to the somewhat stringent 
inclusion/exclusion criteria for the study. Although 162 forensic mental health professionals 
were recruited, only 135 of them met criteria to participate. Finally, the small sample size (and 
the related low response rate) may have been related to the compensation for participation (a 
chance in a drawing for a $50 Amazon gift card), which may not have seemed sufficient to 
compensate for the amount of time required to complete the survey. 
A relatively small and disproportionate sample size is a potentially meaningful limitation 
to this study because it calls into question the generalizability of study findings, especially 
considering the wide variability of responses. Additionally, the sample size and composition 
limited the type of analyses used, such that several of the planned chi-square analyses could not 
be conducted because of violations to the minimum cell frequency assumption. Instead, Fisher’s 
Exact Tests, which are less powerful, had to be performed, decreasing the likelihood of finding 
statistical significance.  
Next, there were limitations related the survey itself. Specifically, item selection and 
clarity could have been improved, which would have increased the utility of study findings. In an 
attempt to ensure survey clarity, pilot testing was conducted on a small sample of graduate 
students to gather feedback and estimate completion time. Although this pilot testing was 
somewhat helpful, only two of the pilot testers had experience conducting CR evaluations. It is 
possible that pilot testing the survey on individuals with more CR experience would have 
improved the clarity and usefulness of certain items. Because this was an anonymous survey 
with no feedback from participants, it is unknown if respondents were able to understand and 
respond to questions as intended. Of particular concern were items asking about “typical” 
practice when conducting CR evaluations. Because CR evaluations are very context specific, 
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there is likely no “typical” CR evaluation. Instead, the choice of testing, collateral 
documentation, and other components largely depends on the situation and context. It is difficult 
to capture this concept and ask meaningful questions about CR evaluation routines, reasoning, 
and methodology—especially in a brief 10-minute survey. To capture more concrete data than 
that “typically” included in CR evaluations, respondents were also asked about components and 
methodology included in their “most recent” CR evaluation. Questions investigating “most 
recent” CR evaluation have limitations too, especially related to representativeness and 
generalizability. 
Finally, because of the largely exploratory nature of this study, several open-ended items 
were included in the survey. Open-ended items provided interesting qualitative data, but were 
difficult to code and compare. The utility of these open-ended items is somewhat limited because 
it is difficult to condense and report the information in an efficient and meaningful manner. 
Relatedly, the inclusion of open-ended information in study findings is subjective and influenced 
by researcher’s opinions about what is relevant, interesting, and/or important.   
6. Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, the results from the current study appear to have some 
important implications for the fields of forensic psychology and forensic psychiatry. First, and 
perhaps most interesting, this study found very few differences between psychiatrists and 
psychologists and the methodologies they employ while conducting CR evaluations. Both 
professions rely upon similar third-party documentation, collateral interviews, and testing—
which may be used to support the proposition that psychologists should be allowed to conduct 
CR evaluations in states that currently limit CR evaluations to only psychiatrists. More research 
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should be conducted investigating the current quality of CR evaluations between disciplines and 
perceptions of experts from each discipline. 
 Additionally, time delay between offense date and evaluation date appears to be a 
significant concern for both disciplines, with psychologists and psychiatrists reporting similarly 
long delays averaging almost ten months. Across disciplines, respondents expressed substantial 
concerns about lengthy time delays and the challenges of retrospective evaluations. More 
research should investigate how lengthy time delays impact CR evaluations—especially relating 
to cognition, access to collateral documentation, and perceptions of expert abilities.  
 Finally, across disciplines, experience seems to play a role in CR evaluations. Those  
with more experience reported higher confidence in their abilities to conduct accurate CR 
evaluations and greater knowledge of legal standards. While it is unknown whether more 
experienced respondents actually have greater abilities and knowledge, greater confidence in 
abilities may contribute to greater efficacy as an expert and possibly even more referrals. Future 
research should investigate whether greater experience improves knowledge of legal standards 
and ability to conduct CR evaluations.   
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Appendix A: Qualtrics Survey 
Part 1: Demographic Information and Inclusion/Exclusion  
 
Thank you for participating in this short survey about Mental State at the Time of Offense (MSO) 
evaluations. This survey is expected to take about 10-15 minutes. Your responses are completely 
anonymous. You may discontinue the survey at any time. You may also stop and restart the survey. At 
the conclusion of the survey, you will be given the opportunity to be entered into a drawing for a $50.00 
Amazon.com gift card. Please contact David DeMatteo JD, PhD (dsd25@drexel.edu) with any questions 
or concerns.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Here are a few definitions for specialized terms used in the survey.  
Mental State at the Time of Offense [MSO] evaluations: Forensic mental health evaluations that involve 
the reconstruction of the defendant’s thoughts, feelings, symptoms, and behaviors before and during the 
commission of an alleged offense. Legal questions may include: insanity, automatism, diminished 
capacity/mens rea, and guilty but mentally ill. Although less common, MSO evaluations can also 
include affirmative defenses (self-defense, provocation, duress, and entrapment), “character” defenses, 
and defenses related to psychoactive substance use.  
Insanity evaluations: Evaluations related to the legal question of insanity, typically defined as an 
inability to appreciate, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of one’s actions.  
If you would like access to these definitions while completing the survey, please open the following link 
in a separate window: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Y5InitC39a_ZQyjysK9t1Lkk21O-
L3mEdZMSJT9i2xM/edit? usp=sharing  
 
What year were you born?  
 
What is your gender?  
Male Female  
What is your race?  
White/Caucasian African American Hispanic 
Asian  
Asian  
Native American Pacific Islander Other  
What is your ethnicity?  
Hispanic or Latino 
Not Hispanic of Latino  
How would you define yourself professionally? (Please select the best fit)  
Clinical psychologist Forensic psychologist Psychiatrist 
Forensic psychiatrist  
Are you licensed to practice psychology in the United States?  
Yes No  
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What year were you first licensed in psychology?  
Are you board certified in psychology?  
Yes No  
Please list your board certification(s) and year(s) obtained. Example: ABFP (2002)  
Are you certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN)?  
Yes No  
Which state(s) are you currently licensed in?  
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado Connecticut Delaware 
District of Columbia Florida  
Georgia Hawaii Idaho  
Illinois Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri  
Montana Nebraska Nevada 
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma 
Oregon Pennsylvania  
Puerto Rico Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas  
Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming  
What level of advanced training do you have? (Please select all that apply)  
PhD 
PsyD 
MD 
Post-Doctoral Fellowship  
Board Certification  
Have you ever conducted a mental state at the time of the offense (MSO) evaluation?  
Yes No  
Approximately what percentage of your clinical/assessment caseload consists of forensic clients?  
0 % of caseload consisting of forensic clients  
 
 
Part 2: CR Evaluation Components and Methodology 
 
What year did you receive board certification?  
Fantastic! You are eligible to complete the remainder of this survey. Please answer the following 
questions about your experience conducting MSO evaluations. Thanks again for your participation.  
 
Approximately how many MSO evaluations have you conducted over your career? (including graduate 
training, internships, residency, fellowship, etc)  
# of MSO evaluations:  
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How many MSO evaluations have you conducted in the last year?  
# of MSO evaluations:  
Please indicate the percentage (%) of each type of evaluation that makes up your total MSO experience 
(including graduate training, internships, residency, fellowship, etc).  
Insanity 
Diminished Capacity/Mens Rea Guilty But Mentally Ill Automatism 
Other  
0% 0% 0% 0%  
Total  
0% 0%  
Think of your most recent MSO evaluation. How much time elapsed between the date of the alleged 
offense and the date of your MSO evaluation?  
(Please be as specific as possible. It would be especially helpful if you could look up the actual dates 
from your most recent MSO evaluation.)  
Date of alleged offense:  
Date of MSO evaluation:  
OR...time elapsed between date of offense and MSO evaluation (in months)  
Based on your experience, what was the longest time that elapsed between an alleged offense 
and your MSO evaluation?  
What information do you typically consider when conducting MSO evaluations? (Please select all that 
apply)  
Diagnostic presentation 
Mental Status Exam 
Interviews with third parties 
Document review (i.e., medical records, psychiatric records, police reports) Psychological testing  
Consultation with other mental health professionals Other  
You indicated that you typically conduct interviews with third parties. Who do you typically interview 
while conducting MSO evaluations?  
Defendant's family Witnesses to the offense  
Jail/prison personnel Referring attorney Defendant's significant other Previous treatment provider 
Teachers  
Other  
Longest time elapsed (in months):  
You indicated that you typically conduct a document review. Please select the documents you 
have access to when conducting MSO evaluations.  
I TYPICALLY have access to these documents when conducting MSO evaluations:  
Select all that apply  
I had access to these documents in my MOST RECENT MSO evaluation:  
Select all that apply  
Police transcripts  
Confessions Court/hearing transcripts Newspaper accounts School records  
In your most recent MSO evaluation, did you include information obtained from a collateral (third- 
party) interview (either in person or on the telephone)?  
Yes (please indicate the # of third-party interviews conducted) No  
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Individualized Education Plan (IEP)  
Medical records  
Psychiatric records  
Previous mental health treatment provider records  
Juvenile placement records Probation records 
Other records:  
Other records: Other records: Other records:  
You indicated that you typically use psychological testing when conducting MSO evaluations. 
What psychological tests do you use?  
I TYPICALLY use these psychological assessments when conducting MSO evaluations:  
Select all that apply  
I used these psychological assessments in my MOST RECENT MSO evaluation:  
Select all that apply  
Beck Depression Inventory - II (BDI-II)  
Beck Anxiety Inventory(BAI) Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)  
Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 2nd Edition (PCL-R)  
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M- FAST)  
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III) Mini–Mental State Examination (MMSE  
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2)  
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF)  
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) Psychopathic Personality Inventory–Revised (PPI-R)  
Rey 15-Item Memory Test II (Rey II)  
Rey 15-Item Memory Test II (Rey II)  
Rogers Criminal Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-CRAS)  
Rorschach  
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales-Fifth Edition (SB- V)  
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms, 2nd Edition (SIRS-2)  
Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS)  
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (SASSI- 3)  
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R) Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT)  
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS–IV)  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II)  
Wechsler Individual Achievement Test Second Edition (WIAT-II)  
Wechsler Individual Achievement Test–Third Edition (WIAT–III)  
Wide Range Achievement Test 4 (WRAT4)  
Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement (WJ III ACH)  
Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities-III (WJ III)  
Validity Indicator Profile (VIP) 
Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT) Other 
Other 
Other 
Other 
Other 
Other 
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Other 
Other  
Regardless of whether you use psychological testing, do you think that psychological testing 
would be valuable in an MSO evaluation context? Why or why not?  
Yes  
No  
Do you typically include a recognized psychiatric diagnosis (DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR or DSM-5) 
in your MSO evaluations?  
Yes No  
Did you include a recognized psychiatric diagnosis (DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR or DSM-5) in your 
MOST RECENT MSO evaluation?  
Yes No  
 
Part 3: Opinions and Open-Ended Questions 
 
How confident are you in your ability to conduct accurate MSO evaluations? 
(1 = Not Confident at All;; 7 = Extremely Confident)  
Do you think you are able to detect when an offender is likely exaggerating their psychological 
symptoms?  
Yes No  
How familiar are you with your jurisdictions insanity statute/legal standards? 
(1 = Not Familiar at All;; 7 = Extremely Familiar)  
  
The final part of this survey consists of a few open-ended questions about the methods you 
employ when conducting MSO evaluations and your opinions about MSO evaluations.  
Your thoughtful responses are greatly appreciated.  
 
No  
Do you have any concerns about the amount of time that elapses between offense and 
evaluation?  
 
What do you do if you suspect an individual is exaggerating his or her psychiatric symptoms 
during a MSO evaluation?  
 
What do you do if an individual claims s/he is not able to recall the alleged offense (during an 
MSO evaluation)?  
 
Do you feel that there is enough guidance from your field about how to conduct MSO 
evaluations?  
Yes 
No 
Explain (if you wish)  
Any other comments you have regarding MSO evaluations.  
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Do you use any specific strategies when asking an individual about their alleged offense? Is there 
anything that you do to mitigate the effect of time on recall abilities?  
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Appendix B: Invitation to Participate in Research 
Hello, 
This is a request to participate in the study, “A Survey of Forensic Mental Health 
Professionals with Experience Conducting Mental State at the Time of Offense Evaluations.”  
You are being contacted because of your possible experience conducting these evaluations. 
I am a JD/PhD student at Drexel University working under the supervision of David 
DeMatteo, JD, PhD. For my Master’s thesis, I am conducting a survey of forensic psychiatrists 
and psychologists who have experience conducting Mental State at the Time of Offense (MSO) 
evaluations.  In addition to sanity evaluations, this survey will also explore clinician’s 
evaluations of other possible CR defenses, such as diminished capacity, mens rea, guilty but 
mentally ill, and automatism.   
CR evaluations are some of the most difficult assessments in forensic mental health.  
Although forensic mental health professionals have been asked to reconstruct offenders’ mental 
state at the time offense for decades, little research exists regarding the methodology and process 
that evaluators use in making these psycholegal opinions.  The purpose of this research study is 
to investigate the process and techniques that forensic mental health professions use when 
forming opinions about an offender’s thought processes, symptoms, and behavior during an 
alleged offense.  Additionally, this study will explore training, experience, disciplinary, and 
jurisdictional differences that may exist in this practice. 
I hope that you will participate in a very brief, online survey about your training and 
experience as a forensic mental health professional conducting CR evaluations.  Please only 
complete this survey once. The survey should take about minutes of your time, depending on 
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your experience.  All participants have the option to enter into a drawing for a $50.00 
Amazon.com electronic gift card. 
Drexel University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved this research study 
(IRB#XXXXX). Your participation is completely voluntary. If you are willing to participate in 
this study, please follow the link below to the online survey. By completing the survey, you are 
indicating your voluntary participation. If you choose to participate, you can stop or withdraw 
your participation at any time. This study will not request any identifying information. All data 
will be kept in secure files.If you have any questions or concerns, please contact David 
DeMatteo, JD, PhD, at 215.553.7107or David.DeMatteo@drexel.edu.  Finally, if you know other 
professionals who conduct CR evaluations, I would be extremely grateful if you would forward 
this email along to them.  As you probably know, CR evaluations are somewhat rare, so finding 
individuals who conduct them can be a difficult task.  I sincerely appreciate your help.  Thank 
you very much for your time. 
 
To complete the online survey, go to: 
http://drexel.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9zvg5T2HnfjaDlP 
 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Megan Murphy 
Master of Science Candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Drexel University  
